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G. EMLEN HALL*

The Forest Service and Western Water
Rights: An Intimate Portrait of United
States v. New Mexico
ABSTRACT
Lawsuits offer an arcane and fundamental way of making basic
water law and policy. The tortured course of litigation set the
course of natural resource policy for years to come. Mimbres
Irrigation District v. Salopek et al., which reached the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1978 under the more glamorous moniker of
United States v. New Mexico, dealtfor the first time with the
important issue of U.S. Forest Service water rights on Forest
Service lands. The decision both resolved the history of Forest
Reservations with respect to water and narrowed and shaped
Forest Service options with respect to future management. This
article provides the intimate details of the Forest Service
litigation. The portrait reveals how the case struggled to define
the Forest Service's past and unwittingly set the course for its
future. The details-the incomplete understandings of history,
the legal posturing in an adversary system, the quirks of
personality in a complex process- combine in this story to show
how time and chance influence our eternal rules about our most
basic resources. The article weaves materials from personal
interviews and various state and federal archives to develop the
tale.
I. THEN AND NOW: THREE TALES IN SEARCH OF A COMMON
HISTORY
At 2:47 P.M. on April 24, 1978, in the U.S. Supreme Court in
Washington, D.C., New Mexico water lawyer Richard Simms proceeded
to the podium and started to argue United States v. New Mexico on behalf
of the State of New Mexico.' Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun,
*
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who did not take much interest in western water rights, noted that
Simms was "neat" and "slender." 2 (Blackmun noted that the lawyer for
the United States was "chubby" and "bearded." 3 The two other lawyers
with him were bearded as well. One of them thought the outcome of the
case turned on the fact that the New Mexico state lawyers had less facial
hair.4) Simms was more awed than terrified on this, his first appearance
5
before the Supreme Court on life or death western water matters.
These days Simms sits in his living room north of Hailey, Idaho,
and looks down at New Mexico, 900 miles south of him, and back at 30
years of legal practice there. He likes to remind listeners that he got his
start as a fledgling attorney in the early 1970s battling with the United
States over the nature and extent of Forest Service water rights in the
West. The fight carried him to the U.S. Supreme Court for the first of
seven times in a long and illustrious career. He remembers the first trip
best of all. "In 1978, I saved the West," he says now, "from an attempted
Forest Service takeover of the most important sources of state water,
6
high in the mountains."
In 1978 Stephen Glasser, now the Forest Service's water rights
program manager, was just getting his start as a surface water
hydrologist in the West. 7 A native of the borough of Queens, New York,
Glasser had just found his way into the Forest Service as one of the brand
new "ologists" in the Service. 8 In the 1950s, the Service had been manned
almost exclusively by foresters, technically trained in a respected
academic discipline. It was one of the measures of the tectonic changes
that the agency went through in the 1970s that more and more
employees from other disciplines -biologists, ecologists, and hydrologists like Glasser-joined the Forest Service corp.9 Glasser got his start
hip deep in the freezing Gallatin River of Montana gauging stream
flows, not supervising timber sales.
These days he sits in his office in the ancient brick Yates Building
at the comer of Fourteenth and Constitution, Washington, D.C. From a
cubicle, Glasser, 58, looks out to his present bailiwick, water in the West,
2. BLACKMUN, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Telephone Interview with Peter R. Steenland, Counsel, Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood LLP, in Washington D.C. (Dec. 21, 2004).
5. Interview with Richard Simms, Attorney, in Hailey, Idaho (Jan. 4-5,2004).
6. Id.
7. Interview with Stephen Glasser, Water Rights & Uses Program Manager, USDA
Forest Serv., in Washington, D.C. (July 23, 2004).
8. Interview with Jim Koser, Retired Highway Eng'r, USDA Forest Serv. (Mar. 1,
1999).
9. HAROLD K. STEEN, THE U.S. FOREST SERVIcE: A HISTORY 318 (1976).
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and back to the case that Richard Simms won. Glasser currently heads
the Forest Service efforts to secure the water needed for National Forests,
primarily in the West. He speaks carefully, with the faint trace of Queens
still in his voice, but he pulls no punches. "The Mimbres decision," he
says, "that's what we in the Service call United States v. New Mexico, has
caused us nothing but headaches ever since 1978. It made it very difficult
for us to manage our resources. It created an impossible barrier to Forest
Service water rights. Getting water rights for National Forests under the
Mimbres standard is like asking a world class pole vaulter to jump 30
feet when the world record is 10 feet. That barrier has become more and
more severe as the Forest Service has been called on more and more to
protect the waters on its lands." 10
In 1978, the U.S. Forest Service lay on the cusp of major changes
in mission and function. In 1976, Congress had set out a new charge for
the Forest Service for the first time in 75 years. The National Forest
Management Act (NFMA) mandated forest-by-forest land use planning
for the 154 Forest units," most of which lay west of the 100th Meridian.
The Service had planned for many years previous on its own initiative.
By 1978, however, the planning choices became public and there was
increasing pressure to shift from the timber management function of
yesterday to what some saw as the recreational and ecological functions
of the future.12 Water on the National Forests would have to drive that
change.
Now the Forest Service manages roughly the same acreage,
configured in the same way, as it did in 1978. The change promised by
NFMA has stalled. Congress has been paralyzed in its efforts to outline a
new, or indeed any statutory path for the Forest Service. The courts,
sometimes reluctantly, sometimes with glee, have managed the National
Forests by injunction. Different administrations have entered the breach
with contradictory rules. By regulation the Clinton Administration
adopted ecological sustainability as a fundamental planning principle.
13
The Bush administration countered with local adaptive management.
The course of water for the different visions has become even more
twisted as the result of United States v. New Mexico.

10.

Interview with Stephen Glasser, supranote 7.

11. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., LAND AREAS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30,1979, at 1 (1979).
12. See generally CHARLES S. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER,
AND TIE FUTURE OF THE WEST (1992).

13. George Hoberg, Science, Politics, and U.S. Forest Service Law: The Battle Over the
Forest Service Planning Rule, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (2004) (discussing President George W.
Bush administration's forest policy as a response to previous policies).
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Ironically, in the desert West, the Forest Service suffers from an
abundance of water. For the most part the lands that the Service
manages lie at the higher mountainous elevations where precipitation is
proportionally greater. Specific locales and general numbers vary
greatly, but the contrast between the water that falls on the forests above
and the deserts below is stark. For example, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
lying along the Rio Grande at 5,000 feet elevation, receives less than nine
inches of annual average precipitation. 14 Taos County's Wheeler Peak,
which feeds the same Rio Grande, elevation more than 11,000 feet, enjoys
annual average precipitation of almost 40 inches a year.' 5 They call the
Albuquerque land outside of the narrow river corridor high desert
because it is so parched. They call the water-rich Wheeler Peak lands a
"giant sponge" because they collect and leak so much water. From a
water point of view, the difference between the Albuquerque "high
desert" and the Wheeler Peak sponge is the difference, say, between
Death Valley and Connecticut. But in the West in general and New
Mexico in particular, the two very different places are inextricably linked
by their connection to a common water source. For better or worse, the
water that the Forest Service has is also the water that downstream
farmers and cities need. United States v. New Mexico represented the
Supreme Court's first big effort to straighten out a relationship that was
as inevitable as it was inextricable.
In the Mimbres case, Richard Simms was sure that he had saved
for the States its share of water originating on the national forest and
flowing down to the desert below. It was the same water that Stephen
Glasser worried about preserving for the National Forests today. History
plagued them both. Simms had won an old lawsuit that had set the
course for state and federal claims to the Forest water ever since. Glasser
had inherited a by now ancient doctrine that molded and constrained his
choices for an altered Forest Service mission. From administration to
administration, the Forest Service could not tell what the mission was.
What are we to make of courts as arbiters of history and creators of
inflexible natural resource rules?
In United States v. New Mexico, the courts twice set the Forest
Service back in time. First, the decision caught the Forest Service in 1978

14. Western Regional Climate Center, Period of Record Monthly Climate Summary for
Albuquerque WSFO Airport, New Mexico (290234), http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/cgi-bin/cli
RECtM.pl?nmalbu (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
15. U.S. Dep't Agric., Natural Resources Conservation Serv., Nat'l Water & Climate
Center, Site Information and Reports for TOLBY, at http://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/snotel
/snotel.pl?sitenum=934&state=nm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006) (listing precipitation measurements for the SNOTEL Site located in the proximity of Wheeler Peak).
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at a time when it really did not know what water rights it needed.
Second, the 1978 decision froze those basic rights in 1897 in a history it
really did not understand.
The combination has left the Forest Service scrambling for
alternatives to water rights altogether, indirectly trying to accomplish
what United States v. New Mexico said the Forest Service could not do
directly. As a result, the already tortured course of federal/state relations
over water originating on the National Forest has been forced to take
even more violent turns whose end is even more unsure than when the
courts took the issue on in the 1970s. How these things come to pass tells
us a lot about how we make critical natural resource decisions in the
twenty-first century West.
II. "LETTING FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS OUT OF THE
BOTTLE"16
Until the Supreme Court decided the monumental Arizona v.
California'7 in 1963, Forest Service water rights did not pose much of a
problem for either federal forest service managers or state water
supervisors. Everyone knew that the high elevation federal forestlands
produced a lot of the water 8 that primarily was governed by the water
law of downstream states for the benefit of farmers and cities. Without
any question at all, most assumed that if the water-rich Forest Service
needed a right to water, even on its own land, it would apply to the
states to secure it. So, on the Gila National Forest where the big battle
over federal water rights would unfold, the Forest Service as recently as
1955 had gone to the New Mexico State Engineer and applied for two
permits to appropriate water, 19 just like any other private appropriator.

16. Interview with Stuart Shelton, Assistant Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Agric., in
Washington, D.C. (July 20,2004).
17. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
18. See, e.g., id. at 555 n.12 (noting how the Colorado River "serve[s] large areas");
Reply Brief of United States, infra note 216, at la-2a (indicating total yield of water from
national forest lands at 200 million acre-feet per year). But compare United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 n.3 (1978) (noting that "[m]ore than 60% of the average annual water
yield in the 11 Western States is from federal reservations.... In the Rio Grande waterresource region, where the Rio Mimbres lies, 77% of the average runoff is from federal
reservations....") with FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FS-600, WATER AND THE FOREST
SERVICE fig. 5 (Jan. 2000) [hereinafter WATER AND THE FOREST SERVICE] (showing the yearly
water yields from national forest lands in the Rio Grande as 29% of the total runoff).
19. Office of State Eng'r, State of N.M., Permit No. 2844, Certificate of Construction
and License to Appropriate Water (May 31, 1955); Office of State Eng'r, State of N.M.,
Permit No. 2868, Certificate of Construction and License to Appropriate Water (Oct. 10,
1955).
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That then universal understanding was grounded in three
nineteenth-century congressional statutes and confirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court when in an off-hand 1935 remark the Court said that the
three acts meant that "all non-navigable waters then a part of the public
domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the
designated states ....
-20 In 1908, however, the Court decided the Winters
case, holding that, when the United States withdrew lands from the
public domain to establish the Fort Belknap Indian reservation, it also
impliedly withdrew sufficient waters to satisfy the purposes for which
21
the lands were withdrawn.
Historically, the so-called "federal reserved water rights"
doctrine applied exclusively to Indian reservations as opposed to federal
reservations of land from the public domain for other federal purposes,
like national forests in general and the Gila National Forest in particular.
In 1955, however, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the
doctrine might apply to other reservations, in that case a federal power
reservation. In 1963 in Arizona v. California,a massive inter-state case that
peripherally drew southwestern New Mexico into its maw, Special
Master Simon Rifkind legally determined that there was no reason why
"the principle underlying the reservation of water rights for Indian
Reservations (is not) equally applicable to other federal establishments
such as National Recreation Areas and National Forests." 22 The Supreme
Court agreed.
All of a sudden the reserved rights doctrine had attached to the
Forest Service and come home to roost in the Gila National Forest at the
very headwaters of a stream that originated high in the mountains of
southwestern New Mexico and quickly tumbled out of the state and into
Arizona on its 1,000 mile run to its juncture with the Colorado at Yuma,
Arizona. 23 The same National Forest at the heart of the original 1963
extension of the doctrine to all federal lands held for a federal non-Indian
purpose would also lie at the heart of the 1978 first formal, detailed

20. Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935). See
also An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands,
and for other Purposes, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866); amended by ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (1870);
An Act in relation to the Hot Springs Reservation in the State of Arkansas; ch. 108, 19 Stat.
377 (1877).
21. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
22. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601. The Supreme Court affirmed Special Master Rifkind's
Report of December 5, 1960, without mentioning Rifkind's elliptical determination with
respect to reserved water rights for non-Indian federal withdrawals of land like the Gila
National Forest. Id.
23. See generally GREGORY McNAMEE, GILA: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AN AMERICAN
RiVER (1994).
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definition of forest federal reserved water rights in United States v. New
Mexico.
In Arizona v. Californiain 1963, the Supreme Court focused on the
headwaters of the Gila-San Francisco watershed, which drained west to
Arizona, rather than the Mimbres, which drained south to nowhere. At
that, the Arizona v. California court hardly concerned itself with Forest
Service claims to the Gila River system, almost none of which involved
consumption of water.24 Instead, the states of Arizona and California set
out to limit as much as they could the right of New Mexicans under state
law to deplete the flows of the headwaters on the theory that curtailing
the lilliputian New Mexico rights could only expand those of their
gargantuan neighbors to the south and west.
In the summer of 1956, the U.S. Supreme Court, acting through
its Special Master, 25 came to rural, out-of-the-way southwestern New
Mexico and took evidence on the nature and extent of New Mexicans'
use of the Gila-San Francisco waters. First, in small Silver City, the heart
of New Mexico mining country, and then in even smaller Reserve, the
county seat of a ranching and farming community that would become
the heart of the Sagebrush Rebellion in New Mexico, hostile Arizona and
California lawyers from Phoenix and Los Angeles and the Special Master
and his clerks and stenographers from San Francisco descended on
relatively backwater southwestern New Mexico. 26 While gathering
evidence, the out-of-state lawyers listened to, criticized, and mocked the
New Mexicans and otherwise tried to minimize New Mexico's
entitlement by use to the small part of the Gila stream system that
quickly left the state. Two hundred thirty-four southwestern New
Mexico irrigators and others testified about local water use. The
testimony yielded almost 4,000 transcript pages.27 The proceedings
diminished what little respect local farmers had for outside interests. The
Forest Service, which held lands in the Gila National Forest along both
streams and their mountain tributaries, did not say much.
But the 1956 Gila-San Francisco proceedings in Arizona v.
California did introduce a couple of key players to the Gila National
Forest's second great appearance in national water battles 22 years later
24.

See SAMUEL H. RIFKIND, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, No. 8, at 96 (Dec. 5, 1960).

The Supreme Court affirmed the report without specifically mentioning the elliptical
finding with respect to Forest Service water rights.
25. Id. at 2-3.
26. HELEN M. INGRAM, PATTERNS OF POLITICS IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: A
CASE STUDY OF NEw MExIco's ROLE IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN BILL 57-58 (1969);
HELEN INGRAM, WATER POLITICS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 84-85 (1990) [hereinafter
WATER POLITICS].

27.

RIFKIND, supra note 24, at 3.
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in United States v. New Mexico. For one, a young Grant County lawyer,
Norman Hodges, just elected district attorney, sat in the audience with
his father and brother, both of whom were local lawyers, and watched
the local farmers and the out-of-state hotshots have at it. Hodges had just
returned from five years of legal practice in nearby Lordsburg under the
aegis of H. Vearle Payne where he had learned some water law. 2s H.
Vearle Payne would go on to a distinguished career as U.S. district judge
for the district of New Mexico, in the course of a long career, himself
making some landmark water rulings. 29 Vearle Payne's prot~gc, Norman
Hodges, would go on to become, first, Grant County district attorney
and then, beginning in 1963, state district judge with jurisdiction over the
waters of the Gila-San Francisco and the Mimbres rivers. The intimate
circle of a small state often thrown into the midst of much wider issues
tightened when in 1976 New Mexico Supreme Court Justice H. Vern
Payne, the son of H. Vearle, wrote the decision upholding state district
judge Norman Hodges' restrictive ruling on the nature and extent of
Forest Service water rights. 3°
The litigation also marked the first appearance in a major interstate western water battle of legendary New Mexico State Engineer
Stephen E. Reynolds. Appointed State Engineer in August, 1955, at the
beginning of a 35 year career as New Mexico state water czar, Reynolds
immediately launched an assault on all the major issues facing the State's
water users.31 Special Master Simon Rifkind and Arizona v. California
came within his ken. In characteristic fashion, Reynolds responded
surely and quickly in two ways to the threat posed by the behemoths to
the west.
First, Reynolds launched a campaign to show that New Mexico
was equitably entitled to a share of the Gila-San Francisco headwaters
beyond the small amount New Mexico residents were then using.
Rifkind refused to recognize future uses for New Mexico. Eventually
Reynolds found a political solution to this legal roadblock. 32

28. Interview with Honorable Norman Hodges, Retired Judge, Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct.
of N.M., in Albuquerque, N.M. (May 11, 2004).
29. Robert J. Nordhaus et al., Revisiting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe: Robert
Nordhaus and Sovereign Indian Control over Natural Resources on Reservations, 43 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 223, 224 (2003).
30. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (1977).
31.

G. EMLEN HALL, HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAs-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE FOR THE PECOS

RIVER 108-29 (2002).
32. WATER POLITICS, supra note 26, at 93; G. Emlen Hall, How the Gila Got Its Spots,
paper delivered under the aegis of the N.M. Humanities Council in Silver City, N.M., (Mar.
24, 2002) (on file with Natural Resources Journal).
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In the meantime, however, Reynolds set out to shore up the
extent of New Mexico's then existing uses. No one knew exactly how
much they were, even after the 1956 hearings in New Mexico and even
after Reynolds prevailed on Rifkind to raise by 15% the existing uses that
33
the Supreme Court would recognize.
To justify that increase, Reynolds promised to formally survey
and determine once and for all the Gila-San Francisco water rights in
New Mexico. This promise resulted in the quickest adjudication suit in
New Mexico's experience, then or since. Between 1963 and 1965, State
Engineer Reynolds and his army of surveyors and one lawyer
investigated on the ground the exact extent and location of existing uses
of water and then filed suit to confirm them. This suit introduced the
State Engineer to the extremely independent farmers and ranchers of
Catron County, some of whom were tractor-driving women, 34 to the
surprise of many, and many of whom were extremely suspicious of nosy
outsiders, especially after the 1956 debacle. The suspicions now extended
to Reynolds and his employees who saw "Steve Reynolds: Wanted Dead
or Alive" posters tacked to Catron County telephone poles and who
35
found it wise to travel with a police escort through the county.
An unflappable local district judge helped to keep the
adjudication proceedings under control and on track. That judge turned
out to be none other than Norman Hodges, appointed to the bench in
1963. What Hodges had not learned about water law as an associate of
H. Vearle Payne and as an observer of the local 1956 Supreme Court
proceedings, he quickly learned as the judge deciding infrequent debates
between the Office of the State Engineer and local ranchers and farmers
over the extent of water rights to which each was entitled. The few cases
that he had to decide involved whether a particular tract of land had
36
ever been irrigated and how many acres it included if it had.
These grounded Norman Hodges in the hardcore state law of
prior appropriation. That law emphasized the diversion of water from
where it naturally occurred and its application to beneficial use where it
never would have gotten but for the intervention of man. Ten years later,
when he was asked to consider a water right claim by the Forest Service
that involved leaving water in place, Hodges said that he had never

33. WATER POLITICS, supra note 26, at 93; HALL, supranote 31.
34. Mary Jo Lass Woodfin, Found Women: Catron County, New Mexico, 4 MS., No. 8,
1976, at 57-61.
35. Telephone Interview with Paul Bloom, Former Gen. Counsel to the State Eng'rs
Office, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 17, 2004).
36. Interview with Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 28, at 9.
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heard of such a thing. 37 Between 1963 and 1965, the use it or never get it
or lose it principle of western water law settled into his soul. Long before
the exact claims of the Forest Service came before him in what became
United States v. New Mexico, Hodges had learned from the Gila-San
Francisco that water rights came from water use.
The Gila National Forest, however, had always contained the
seeds of another different approach to water and land. Famous
conservationist Aldo Leopold, by some accounts the father of applied
ecology, had known the Gila country from his earliest days as a Forest
Service employee in nearby Arizona at the inception of the Forest Service
in the first two decades of the twentieth century. 38 Leopold always
viewed recreation as an important function of the Gila that he loved.
Early in his life he viewed hunting as the form of recreation for which
the new National Forests were ideally suited. 39 Finally, early on Leopold
had convinced Forest Service Region 3, of which the Gila was a part, to
administratively set aside a portion of the Forest as a primitive area, the
first of its kind anywhere in the United States. 4°
Over the next 50 years, Leopold's idea slowly worked its way up
the Forest Service chain of administration, from the Gila National Forest
to all of the southwestern Region 3, from the southwest region to all of
the national forests, and, finally, from the Chief Forester's national office
to Congress itself.41 The 1964 Wilderness Act 42 owed its beginnings to
Leopold's 1915 survey, with his friend and former Gila Forest supervisor
Fred Winn, mapping America's first wilderness area. 43
The area encompassed in that pioneering work included the
headwaters of the Mimbres stream system. Leopold's Forest Service plan
for the area combined his concerns for recreation, wildlife, and water.
The inter-relationship between these three factors in the Mimbres water
rights of the Forest Service would lie at the heart of United States v. New
Mexico's determination of all Forest Service water rights a half century
later. Some wondered how the adjudication of such a fundamental issue
could have arisen in such a backwater, but Aldo Leopold had planted
the seeds of the dispute in precisely this place and with precisely these
ideas.

37. Id.
38. ALDO LEOPOLD, ALDO LEOPOLD'S SOUTHWEST 6-11 (David E. Brown & Neil B.
Carmony eds., 2003).
39. Louis S. WARREN, THE HUNTER's GAME 71-125 (1997).
40. LEOPOLD, supra note 38, at 162.
41. Id.
42. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1964).
43. LEOPOLD, supra note 38, at 11.
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It turned out that the Mimbres River provided the perfect
physical backdrop for a clear view of the forest conflict. From the top
down, the Mimbres watershed looked like most western watersheds. At
its height, a relatively low 9,400 feet, almost 30 inches of precipitation fell
a year and the terrain was high alpine meadows and mountains and
valleys. 44 The elevation quickly dropped the farther south (and west) you
feet
went until 60 miles below you arrived in Deming, elevation 4,300
45
and annual precipitation a little more than nine inches per year.
Irrigated agriculture started in these lower desert elevations.
Beginning in the 1860s and continuing by fits and starts through the turn
of the century, private farmers had moved along the Mimbres River, as
they had done along most New Mexico water courses, and developed
irrigated farms. In a classic desert pattern, the farming had started as low
on the Mimbres as possible, where the terrain was easiest, the growing
season the longest, but the water supply was still adequate. 46
From those beginnings, Mimbres irrigation development had
moved both upstream and downstream. 47 Up the river, the water supply
improved but the terrain became steeper and steeper and the land harder
and harder to farm. Eventually, by the turn of the century, the farms
furthest upstream would find themselves surrounded by land reserved
for the Gila National Forest in 1899. But with the Forest's creation what
became classic inholdings never reached far up into the stream's real
origins higher still in the Mimbres watershed.
From the initial development of private farms in the middle
reaches of the Mimbres, subsequent irrigation development had spread
downstream as well. South toward desert-dominated Deming, the flows
of the Mimbres became more and more ephemeral, the product not so
much of high mountain water, originating in the forest uplands, as of
floods rushing into a poorly defined stream channel from tributary
canyons and arroyos to the lower east and west. Even here, the use of

44. U.S. Dep't Agric., Natural Resources Conservation Serv., Nat'l Water & Climate
Center, Site Information and Reports for SIGNAL PEAK, at http://www.wcc.nrcs.
usda.gov/snotel/snotel.pl?sitenum=755&state=nm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006) (listing
precipitation measurements for the SNOTEL Site located on Signal Peak).
45. Western Regional Climate Center, Period of Record Monthly Climate Summary for
Deming, N.M., http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/cgi-bin/ciRECtM.pl?nmdemi (last visited Oct. 5,
2005).
46.

SUSAN M. BERRY & DAVID B. BERRY, SETrLEMENT AND SURFACE WATER USE OF THE

UPPER MIMBRES VALLEY 1860-1907, at 7 (June 1, 1984).
47. LEGAL Div., OFFICE OF N.M. STATE ENG'R, MIMBRES RIVER SETUP (undated) (The
setup shows a solid block of middle range irrigation ditches developing around 1870.
Above the Shingle Canyon USGS gaging station, ditches date years later. Below the San
Lorenzo community ditch development dates tend to be more and more junior as well).
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Mimbres waters had begun before the United States set any high country
land aside as a national forest.
But the battle over rights to the Mimbres River pitted the lower
irrigated areas against the higher forest ones, the drier farm areas against
the wetter wilderness ones, the state-based water rights below and what
became, after the 1963 Supreme Court decision, the possible federal
rights above. As the Department of Agriculture's Stuart Shelton sees it,
Arizona v. California let the genie of federal water rights out of the state
bottle. For the first time, there was a possibility across the west of a real
conflict between the two as federal authorities in Washington started
pushing the possibility of establishing federal control of western waters,
the same waters that had been thought to have been under the plenary
control of the states until 1963. Ironically, the issue galvanized first in
Aldo Leopold's backyard on the Mimbres.
III. "A USE IS NOT A PURPOSE"
What became United States v. New Mexico, a grand national
struggle between the relative rights of the federal and state governments
for control of a common water source, started in the mid-1960s as a
private late-night water grab by a couple of out-of-town desert water
thieves looking to get a late foothold in the ephemeral flood flows of the
lower Mimbres River.48 Tony Salopek was an aggressive, high-rolling,
politically active farmer and rancher from Las Cruces, a couple of
drainages east of the Mimbres Basin in the much larger Rio Grande
watershed. But, like acquaintance Henry Schlotauer, Salopek had huge
30,000 acre grazing leases on state lands 49 lying on both sides of the
lower Mimbres River, west and north of Deming and 60 miles south of
the upstream section of the river fed by the base flows, such as they
were, originating in the National Forest.5 0 In early spring 1966, Salopek
built a rough dam across the Mimbres stream channel, hoping thereby to
force what floodwater came his way out onto the adjoining lease lands
where his cattle grazed. Schlotauer followed a slightly more moderate
course, cutting down the banks of the river so that it would have less
capacity to constrain high flows and dump more onto his bordering
leased lands. In previous years, the two cattlemen had resisted the efforts

48. Interview with Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 28, at 9.
49. Transcript of Record at vol. V, 42-44, Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564
P.2d 615 (1977) (Civ. No. 6326) (Institutional Lease between the Comm'r of Pub. Lands,
State of N.M. & Tony Salopek; lease total 32,452.44 acres, Oct. 1, 1965).
50.

OFFICE OF N.M. STATE ENG'R, RVER HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY & MAP SHEETS (1971)

(showing on page 48 the Salopek diversions and on page 53 the Schlotauer diversion).
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of even further downstream irrigators to come on their lease lands to
improve the stream channel so more water would pass downstream.
Now, the more aggressive steps of Salopek and Schlatauer proved too
much.
The Mimbres Valley Irrigation Company, a turn-of-the-century
private corporation that had tried to establish irrigation even farther
downstream, and with a sketchy subsequent history, sued the two on the
grounds that Salopek and Schlotauer had illegally taken flood flows that
should have run down to them.5' In the spring of 1966, State District
Judge Norman Hodges, fresh in from the Gila-San Francisco
adjudication just across the Continental Divide, issued a temporary
injunction against the Salopek and Schlotauer diversions and got ready
to decide what then looked like nothing more than a small, obscure, local
52
water squabble.
Then, through the summer and fall of 1966, things got
complicated along the Mimbres in Luna County. The suit started to
spread to more parties along more of the river. 53 In reaction, Schlotauer
and Salopek each hired southern New Mexico lawyers with strong
statewide political and water connections to defend them. Schlotauer
chose Deming's Ike Smalley, for years a leader in the New Mexico State
Senate; Salopek picked Edwin L. Mechem, a once and future New
Mexico governor with a real interest in water law.54 Each defendant
lawyer challenged the water rights of the plaintiff Irrigation Company
just as the Irrigation Company challenged the water rights of the two
ranchers.
And then the New Mexico State Land Office, the owners of the
land onto which Schlotauer and Salopek poured the water, intervened to
protect the State's rights to the improvements that their lessees were
making by delivering water to the State's lands. All of a sudden, Mimbres
Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek looked a lot broader and deeper to Judge
Hodges than it initially had appeared. Rather than cut the lawsuit back
to a manageable size, he agreed to expand it to include the whole
Mimbres River.
First, after four days of confused and confusing trial in March
and October 1966, Hodges, on January 24, 1967, directed the State
Engineer's Office to inventory all of the surface water rights of the
51. Complaint, vol. V, 1-4, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326).
52. Temporary Restraining Order & Order to Show Cause, vol. V, 5-7, Salopek, 564 P.2d
615 (Civ. No. 6326); Interview with Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 28, at 9.
53. Complaint in Intervention & Order Allowing Intervention, vol. V, 25-26, Salopek,
564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326).
54. HALL, supra note 31, at 116.
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Mimbres River stream system, from the Deming desert at the bottom to
the administrative Forest Service wilderness at the top. "A decision,"
Hodges wrote, "cannot be made in this matter without a hydrographic
survey being made."55
Over the next three and a half years, State Engineer
hydrographic surveyors went from Deming to the headwaters of the
Mimbres, mapping water uses. In the meantime, the existing seven
parties to the original suit waited. By July 1970, the State Engineer
investigators had discovered over 900 additional claims to the Mimbres
and had analyzed and mapped them. The claims included the State's
version of the Forest Service rights.56 At that point, State Engineer
Reynolds moved to turn the original suit into a stream-system
adjudication, turning all the claimants into defendants and fixing all of
their water rights once and for all.57 Now the original three party law suit
had grown to 900 parties, including, still incidentally at this point, the
rights of the Forest Service. Hodges agreed to the expansion on the same
58
day.
Complex factors explain why Judge Hodges found the claims of
just the railroad, the state land office, and the Mimbres irrigators so
tangled that he thought it would be better if the State Engineer
straightened them all out once and for all as he had already seen State
Engineer Reynolds do on the neighboring Gila-San Francisco. The
Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. lawyer screamed bloody murder, alleging
that his suit had nothing to do with any other water rights on the
Mimbres and certainly not all of the other water rights.59 The politically
powerful lawyers for Salopek and Schlotauer stood by, recognizing that
delay favored their position and that a full blown, stream system
adjudication might buy a lot of time. Reynolds went along.
Finally, Reynolds told Hodges that the State Engineer had the
money to do both the survey and the adjudication suit.60 In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the State Engineer was filing adjudication suits willy

55. Transcript of Record, vol. V, 89-90, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326) (order
requiring hydrographic survey of the surface water rights of the Mimbres River system
located in the counties of Grant and Luna, N.M., Jan. 24,1967).
56. Id. vol. V, supp. 102, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326) (list attached to
complaint-in-intervention, July 31, 1971).
57. Motion to Intervene, vol. V, 91, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326).
58. Order Granting Motion to Intervene, vol. V, 93, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No.
6326).
59. Motion for an Order Setting Aside Intervention at vol. V, 105-06, Salopek, 564 P.2d
615 (Civ. No. 6326).
60. Interview with Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 28, at 9.
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nilly across the stream systems of the state;61 the Mimbres was just
another one. The stream system adjudication would only cost the Luna
County court time.
Reynolds even offered to help Hodges with the extra work by
finding and paying for a special master. 62 That master could attend to the
nasty factual arguments that might arise in any of the 900 water rights to
be adjudicated, including Forest Service claims. Hodges was still the
only district judge in the large area covered by the Sixth Judicial District
and he welcomed the State Engineer's suggestion. He was equally
pleased when the State Engineer arranged for the services of Irwin S.
Moise as special master. On December 4, 1970, Hodges appointed Moise
his "special master and referee." 63
The choice of Moise made sense in many ways. A semi-retired
Albuquerque lawyer at the time, associated with a prestigious firm,
Moise had time for the job even at the $12 an hour that it came with.64 In
the decade between 1960 and 1970, Moise had served as a justice on the
New Mexico Supreme Court and had just retired as chief justice. On the
court, he had decided many of the groundbreaking cases on the
substance of state water rights and the procedures in state adjudication
suits.65 If Reynolds was the most litigious S.O.B. because his name

61. See, e.g., S.E. REYNOLDS, STATE ENGINEER, TWENTY-NINTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE
STATE ENGINEER OF NEW MEXICO, JULY 1,1968 TO JUNE 30, 1970, at 17-20.

62. Interview with Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 28.
63. Transcript of Record at vol. V, 135, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326) (Order of
Reference, Dec. 18, 1970).
64. Id.
65. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch, 81 N.M. 414, 467 P.2d 986 (1970) (opinion by
Chief Justice Moise holding that a private corporation had the public power of
condemnation to secure access to public water); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Allman, 78 N.M. 1,
427 P.2d 886 (1967) (opinion by Moise holding that due process required equal
opportunities to apply the doctrine of relation back among surface and groundwater
rights); McBee v. Reynolds, 74 N.M. 783, 399 P.2d 110 (1965) (opinion by Moise holding
that the State Engineer had no jurisdiction over groundwater rights filed before a basin was
declared); Clements v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 74 N.M. 373, 394 P.2d 139 (1964) (opinion
by Moise holding that the State Engineer had correctly applied the law in denying a change
in the point of diversion); State ex rel. Reynolds v. McLean 74 N.M. 178, 392 P.2d 12 (1964)
(opinion by Moise holding that a district court's "decision" to confirm a special master's
findings was not a final order that could be appealed); Durand v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist.,
71 N.M. 479, 379 P.2d 773 (1963) (opinion by Moise holding that the State Engineer had
correctly applied the law in denying a change in the point of diversion); State ex rel.
Reynolds v. Mendenhall, 68 N.M. 467,362 P.2d 998 (1961) (opinion by Moise holding that a
well the development of which was begun prior to the declaration of an underground basin
did not require a permit even though it was completed after the declaration of a basin);
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sharp, 66 N.M. 192, 344 P.2d 943 (1959) (opinion by Moise holding
that ajudication proceedings in district court were not reviewable if supported by
substantial evidence); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Massey, 66 N.M. 199, 344 P.2d 947 (1959)
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appeared so frequently in water litigation, then Moise was his greatest
judicial fan so frequently did he review and approve the State Engineer's
decisions. In the late 1940s, well before he became a judge, Moise had
been deeply involved in the drafting and adoption of the inter-state
Pecos River Compact, as bitter a negotiation and as complex a solution as
ever seen in bitter, complex western water affairs. 66 On a more personal
level, Moise had lived across the fence from Reynolds on Santa Fe's east
side while serving on the state supreme court. The two men had become
friends. Moise also belonged to the small New Mexico Jewish
community in which Reynolds's chief lawyer, Paul Bloom, also actively
participated. 67 When it came time to pick someone who could help Judge
Hodges with particular claims to the Mimbres Stream system, Justice
Moise fit on many scores.
It did not take long for the Forest Service issues to emerge from
what had started as a three-party Deming battle and grown into a 900party stream-wide adjudication involving all private, state, and federal
claims to the entire Mimbres stream system. 68 Under established federal
law, the Forest Service, as a federal agency, had to submit to the
jurisdiction of the state court.69 The United States responded August 2,
1971, with a 13-page answer. In it the U.S. Department of Justice
Attorney Donald W. Redd, a trial lawyer in the Department's Land and
Natural Resources Division in Washington, began to set out the nature
and extent of Forest claims to the lands withdrawn and reserved. 70
In one paragraph deep in his complex answer, Redd set out the
standard reserved rights theory, imported from Winters and adopted in
Arizona v. California. The water rights of the Forest Service attached to the
common source as of the date of the land reservations (1899-1910) in an

(opinion by Moise holding that adjudication proceedings in district court were not
reviewable if supported by substantial evidence).
66. HALL, supra note 31; Record of Meeting of the Pecos River Compact Commission,
in Santa Fe, N.M. at 109 (Dec. 4, 1948).
67. Telephone Interview with Paul Bloom, supranote 35.
68. Transcript of Record, vol. V, 111-29, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326) (Notice of
Lis Pendens, Sept. 8, 1970 & associated Exhibit A, listing 902 parties defendant in
adjudication); id. at 145 (Affidavit of Service to U.S. Attorney for Dist. of N.M. & U.S. Att'y
Gen. John N. Mitchell).
69. McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000) (unchanged since enactment on July
10, 1952, waiving sovereign immunity of the United States so that it could be joined in state
water adjudications); United States v. Dist. Ct. for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971)
(finding that the McCarran amendment was an "all-inclusive" statute that enabled
adjudication of appropriated, riparian, and reserved water rights); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc.,
FOREsT SERVICE MANUAL § 2541.7 (May 1974, amend. 14).
70. Transcript of Record, vol. IV, 1, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326) (Answer to
Complaint in Intervention by the United States of America, filed Aug. 2, 1971).
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amount necessary for "the requirements and purposes of said
reservation." 71 But what were those purposes at the time of the land
reservation? And what happened if the purposes of the Forests changed
because the values for which they were managed evolved, as had been
the case with the Gila and most other National Forests, and their water
needs changed? Had the Supreme Court adopted this open-ended view
of the evolving purpose of Forest Service water rights, United States v.
New Mexico would have looked very different in 1978 and the course of
federal-state relations over water would have taken a very different
course after then. As it was, none of this was seen in 1971.
Indeed, at the time, the Forest Service was just beginning to deal
in any systematic way with establishing its rights in adjudication suits.
For years, the Chief Forester had directed regional foresters and those
below them to keep states informed about water needs. 72 In the wake of
Arizona v. California and a growing emphasis on land use planning, the
pressure increased to define existing uses and outline future needs. The
Washington office pushed Regional Foresters to assert formally enough
water rights for modem forest purposes. The Regional Foresters pushed
the Forest Supervisors up and down the chain of command. The Forest
Supervisors did the best they could, recognizing that, the closer federal
water claims got to the ground, the more controversial they became. The
pace stepped up as the Forest Service got dragged into more and more
state adjudication suits, demanding a formal adjudication of the local
Forest Service claims. 73 The ambiguous answer filed by Redd in 1971 in
the Mimbres adjudication tracked the instructions for Forest Claims in
the Forest Service Manual. 74
It did not take long for Special Master Moise to ask for
clarification. On August 4, 1971, only two days after the United States
had answered, Moise called for a pre-trial conference to be held
September 16 at the Luna County District Courthouse in Deming, New
Mexico. Among a few other general concerns, Special Master Moise
sought "clarification of the claims of the United States of America for the
Gila National Forest.... "75 As it turned out, the Forest Service needed at
least a year to document the more than 200 existing uses on the Gila
National Forest, most of which involved stock and wildlife ponds, and to
71. Id. at 165.
72. Interview with Stuart Shelton, supra note 16; U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE
MANUAL § 2541.11 (1980, amend 27).
73. Interview with Stuart Shelton, supranote 16.
74. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 2541.03 (1980, amend. 27); U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIc., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL, § 2541.03 (May 1974, amend. 14).
75. Transcript of Record, vol. IV, 175, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326) (Notice of
Hearing, Aug. 4,1971).
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assemble its other water needs. That was acceptable to the State, which
had a lot of work to do of its own adding and changing defendants on
the existing list of more than 900 claimants. It would be a year at least
before either the State or the United States would be ready to specify real
issues and try them.
Sure enough, almost a year to the day after the initial pre-trial
conference, Special Master Moise convened a second pre-trial conference
on September 26, 1972, this time in Silver City. Now the parties agreed
for the first time that Moise would have to decide whether or not "the
limits as to uses for which water could be reserved or withdrawn in
national forests were fixed as of the time that the national forest was
created," 76 an issue that went to the heart of U.S. attorney Don Redd's
initial, unclear claim. The State, the United States, and the Special Master
also agreed that the special master would have to decide whether
recreation use was within the purposes for which water could have been
reserved between 1899 and 1910 when the Mimbres watershed lands
within the Gila National Forest were withdrawn and reserved. 77 On
these issues of clarification, Special Master Moise invited briefs by both
parties by December 1.
In addition to the promise of the definition and resolution of
some fundamental issues, the proceedings in the fall of 1972 introduced
a new key player in the lawsuit, Richard Simms. Simms joined the State
Engineer office that September after a year clerking for Chief Judge
Oliver Seth of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Simms had spent most
of his year as a clerk reading appellate briefs. When it came time to leave
the clerkship and find another job, Simms had told Judge Seth that he
was interested in specializing in an area that involved sustained, high
level, important litigation. Judge Seth recommended water law as a
specialty and State Engineer Reynolds, a long-time Santa Fe acquaintance for whom Seth had great respect. 78 Based on Seth's recommendation, Reynolds hired Simms, who joined a small legal staff now including
three lawyers.
In the fall of 1972, State Engineer General Counsel Paul Bloom
was swamped with work. Litigation over the water rights of Pueblo
Indians was picking up speed. 79 Various inter-state deals were coming

76. Pre-Trial Order, Oct. 25, 1972, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978)
(No. 77-510), app. at 38-39 (reciting that a pre-trial conference was held Sept. 26, 1972, in
Silver City).
77. Id.
78. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
79. Memorandum Opinion and Order, New Mexico v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993
(D.N.M., Jan. 24,1986) (No. 6639-M Civ.).
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unraveled. 8° It looked like Forest Service issues were about to explode on
the Mimbres. Simms took a look at the emerging federal reserved rights
issues there, decided that these were the kinds of issues that most
interested him, and offered to take the case off Bloom's hands. Bloom
gladly agreed. 81 On October 12, 1972, right between Moise's order for
briefs on the forest issues and their deadline of December 1, Simms took
over the Mimbres case.
The questions posed by Moise were just the kind that had
brought Simms to the job. Without much direction from Bloom and
despite the fact that he did not know much about it beforehand, Simms
tore into the issue. On November 30, 1972, he filed his first Brief for the
State of New Mexico in Judge Hodges' court.82 The brief made it clear
that the State believed that the Forest Service could only claim federal
reserved water rights for purposes that existed at the time of the
reservation of Gila lands between 1899 and 1910. Simms went on to
concede that recreation was a purpose of the reservations at that time.
"An extremely technical argument," he wrote in a style reminiscent of
the opinions he had drafted for Chief Judge Seth, "could be made in
order to establish that recreation was not a valid purpose for the creation
of a national forest .... We find the argument ill-advised and concede the
point (that recreation is a forest purpose)."8 3
In making the concession, Simms was treading on dangerous
ground. Once he opened the door to reserved rights for recreation, then
all the related claims would rush in: reserved rights for fish necessary to
recreational fishing, for other wildlife, for boating, even for ski areas. In
the Mimbres drainage of the Gila, Aldo Leopold early on had insisted on
managing the area at least in part for its recreational values, but did
insistence like that rise to the level of an original purpose? 84 Based on his
own years hiking and camping in the National Forests of the Southwest,
Simms initially just assumed so.
Eventually the issue of recreation as a basis for Forest Service
reserved rights in the Gila National Forest would emerge as a key issue
before the U.S. Supreme Court; the Court, in upholding the ultimate
position adopted by the State of New Mexico, would unanimously reject
the point that Simms initially had conceded.8 5 But during the course of

80. HALL, supra note 31, at 127-29 (discussing the Pecos River Compact).
81. Id.
82. Transcript of Record, vol. IIl, 425, Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564
P.2d 615 (1965) (Civ. No. 6326) (Brief for Plaintiff in Intervention).
83. Id. at 467.
84. LEOPOLD, supra note 38, at 8-9.
85. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705, 718 (1978).
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the litigation, Simms paid dearly for what he originally wrote. The
United States took constant glee in reminding Simms and the State that
they originally had agreed that recreation was a purpose of the Forest
86
from the start.
Simms also paid dearly for his early concession with his new
boss, State Engineer Reynolds. Reynolds voraciously read everything
that came out of all of the branches of his office. Eventually he got to the
brief on recreational issues that Simms had submitted at the end of
November 1972. As always, he could not stop himself from commenting
on it. On the upper right hand corner of the brief Reynolds wrote in a
firm hand, "A use is not a purpose" and sent the already filed brief back
to Simms.

87

By this elliptical remark Reynolds meant that Forest "purposes"
and Forest "uses" were not identical. Congress in the Organic Act and
the courts interpreting it, Reynolds was suggesting, had authorized the
Forest Service to permit and regulate all kinds of uses of National Forest
lands. However, those permissible uses were not necessarily purposes
for which the Forests had been withdrawn and reserved. Only the
limited purposes, not the broader uses, would give rise to federal
reserved water rights. Recreation (and its associated values), intimated
Reynolds, might be a use, but it probably was not a purpose and could
not be the basis for a federal reserved right.
It is not clear where State Engineer Reynolds got this lawyer-like
distinction between "uses" and "purposes." Years later, when I had
begun teaching federal public land law at the University of New Mexico
law school, Reynolds allowed, in that self-deprecating way of his, that he
should probably take the course since he did not know enough about
Forest Service law. However, he knew enough in 1972 to settle for the
first time in the case on a fundamental distinction between Forest "uses"
and Forest "purposes" that would prove essential and fundamental from
then on and in the Supreme Court's ultimate restriction of federal
reserved water rights six years later.
Neither Simms nor Bloom immediately caught on to the
fundamental issue referred to by Reynolds in 1972. By 1976, however,
Simms had to formally reverse positions on the recreational issue, now
saying that recreation was not an authorized purpose of the Forests, just
a permitted use. He attributed the mistake to the fact that he had just

86.
87.

See, e.g., infra sources cited notes 130-131.
Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
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begun to practice law in 1972 and did not know any better. 88 The U.S.
attorney would not buy Simms' "inexperience and subsequent
education" as an excuse for the State's inconsistent stances on the
recreational issue. 89 The fact of the matter was that neither Bloom nor
Simms immediately snapped to State Engineer Reynolds' elliptical note.
They were too busy getting ready for the only trial that would ever be
held on the nature and extent of water rights in the Mimbres Basin by the
Forest Service for the Gila National Forest. Special Master Moise set the
Forest Service question for hearing October 9, 1973, in Deming, New
Mexico.
It turned out to be a boiling fall day in southern New Mexico.
The cooling system for the elegant Luna County Courthouse was on the
blitz and it was hot inside. Court personnel had thrown open the
courtroom windows to try to cool things down. Dark green U.S.
Immigration Service buses, similar to Forest Service vehicles, kept
pulling into the parking lot, loaded with Mexicans who had tried,
unsuccessfully this time, to get across the nearby border. 90 It was
sometimes hard to hear in the warming court room, but the only hearing
on the big issue of federal reserved water rights for the National Forests
took only the morning.
For the United States, Redd called only two witnesses, the
national administrative coordinator of all water rights for the Forest
Service, Wesley Carlson, 91 and Norman Ritchey, an employee of the Gila
National Forest who was in charge of the water management program
for the Forest.92 Carlson opened by describing for Redd in general how
the Forest Service identified its water uses and its water needs. The brief
testimony fit the post Arizona v. California Forest Service efforts to
inventory Forest Service water uses and needs and it dovetailed as well
with the general inventory prescriptions in the most current Forest
Service Manual. 93 But Carlson did not acknowledge any limitations that
might be imposed by the reserved rights doctrine and said nothing about
88. Transcript of Record, vol. V+, at 39, Mimbres Valley IrrigationCo. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d
615 (1965) (Civ. No. 6326) (letter from Richard A. Simms, Special Assistant Att'y Gen., N.M.
State Eng'r Office, to Honorable Norman Hodges, Dist. J. (Feb. 4,1976)).
89. Letter from Donald W. Redd, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to
Honorable Norman Hodges, Dist. J. (Feb. 12, 1976) (on file with Natural Resources Journal).
90. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5; Letter from Richard A. Simms,
Special Assistant Att'y Gen., N.M. State Eng'r Office, to author Uune 3, 2003) (on file with
Natural Resources Journal).
91. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77-510), app. at 48-49
(Transcript of Hearing Before Special Master on October 9, 1973, filed in Luna County Dist.
Ct., Dec. 17, 1973).
92. Id. at 83.
93. Id. at 83-84.
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any historical distinction between forest uses, actual or proposed, and
forest purposes at the time of the reservations.
Indeed, Carlson's view of forest water needs included recreation,
included wildlife, included aesthetics. "If it's a legitimate National Forest
use," testified Carlson, unwittingly referring to a term that would
become increasingly loaded as the case moved on, "if it's located on the
National Forest, and it's for a public recreation service, and the water is
to be used on the National Forest, it comes from the National Forest, it
94
could be claimed under reservation." Carlson was not a lawyer. In
1972, the doctrine of federal reserved water rights was not as welldeveloped as it would be by 1976. However, his testimony did not show
much understanding either for the threat that expansive Forest Service
rights posed to states or for what would emerge as the sharp limitations
on the federal claims. And, although Carlson did not know it, he had just
walked into the purpose/use trap that State Engineer Steve Reynolds
had tried to set.
In Deming that morning, State Engineer General Counsel Paul
Bloom, not Richard Simms, cross-examined the government's two
witnesses, beginning with Carlson. While Simms had taken over the
primary responsibility for the case and was writing everything for it,
Bloom was still the more experienced trial attorney and continued in that
limited role. Bloom lit into Carlson on a variety of subjects related to the
Forest Service inventory process, but his cross-examination never got
down to the fundamentals of the reservation doctrine and Forest Service
water rights. 95
The Forest Service's only other witness, Norman Ritchey, tried to
connect Carlson's general water principles to actual water inventories
that the Forest Service was carrying out in the Gila. He had only worked
for the Gila for three years and he only had the help of a local Forest
Service wild life biologist who had just been hired, but he had tried to
round up all existing and future water uses in, as he said, "a preliminary
sort of way." He had gathered them in an early computer printout that
identified by number and location all of the Gila Forest claims in the
Mimbres watershed. Ritchey brought the list with him to court and
96
showed it to the State Engineer lawyers for the first time.
Ritchey's list included over two hundred items. Two were
licenses from the State Engineer himself. Many of the others involved
stock tanks and small arroyo dams that cattle grazers and the Forest
Service traditionally built and managed together for joint cattle and
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 56 (Carlson testimony).
Id. at 58-73.
Id. at 84-85 (Transcript of Norman Ritchey testimony).
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wildlife distribution purposes. Others involved existing and proposed
recreational facilities, ranging from primitive campgrounds to large lakes
and boating, a few constructed, some the dream of a Bureau of
Reclamation planner. It was all there in Ritchey's list and testimony, the
minimal facilities on the ground, the much more ample dreams of the
Forest Service projected way into the future. (There was no talk about
Forest purposes in the past that finally would turn out to be the basis
and the limit of Forest Service water rights.)97
There was even a claim for what the Forest Service identified in
its printouts as "instream flow rights" for fish purposes. The existing
Forest Service Manual explicitly had directed Forest officials to list such
claims in their inventories. 98 Ritchey and the wildlife biologist who had
just joined the Gila National Forest staff had identified a place high in the
Mimbres watershed, on a small tributary of the Mimbres main stem, well
above any other right established under state law, where some rare trout
required guaranteed flows for survival.99 Ritchey could not say how
much water would be required until later, when he guessed at a flow of
2 cubic feet per second for the claim.
Here was an idea way ahead of its time. In 1973 the state officials
had never heard of such a thing as a minimum instream flow right, a
protected right to leave water in place. They hardly heard it as Ritchey
testified and only noticed it when their engineering aides later tore into
the specifics of the Forest Service list of uses and found the reference. 100
Slowly, they realized that the claim for instream flows to support fish
that once were and might again become the object of sportsmen
combined into a recreational claim that might not be a purpose of the
Forest reservation. Cross-examining Ritchey, the lawyer Paul Bloom
could not quite put the pieces together.
But by noon on that sweltering October day, the evidentiary trial
in what would become the groundbreaking reserved water rights case
for all National Forests was done. It had taken all of a couple of hours.
The State of New Mexico called no witnesses and introduced only one
exhibit, a copy of the 1936 Forest Manual that directed the Forest Service
to acquire all of its water rights from the States where the forests were
located. 101 By way of contrast, a simultaneous Colorado proceeding

97. Id. at 192-93.
98. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL, § 2541.03 (1980, amend. 27).
99. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77-510) app., at 87-90
(Transcript of Norman Ritchey's Testimony).
100. Id. at 137 (Letter from Richard A. Simms, Special Assistant Att'y Gen., State of
N.M., to Honorable Irwin S. Moise, Special Master, Dist. Ct. of N.M. (Nov. 22, 1974)).
101. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
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10 2
involving the same Forest Service issues took months. And when in
1990, twelve years after the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the issues
coming before Special Master Moise in 1973, the Forest Service tried to
rescue what they could and presented 28 days of expert testimony over
the course of a year in a proceeding in which they invested over $800,000
just for posters, 10 3 the Service found itself stuck with an incomplete
decision based on two hours of testimony in a sweltering Deming
courthouse.
Of course, the recreational issue had never been resolved at the
October 1973 hearing and the related instream flow problem was still
below everyone's radar. The later problem began to awkwardly surface
as Moise began to assemble his decision. On January 17,1974, he wrote a
letter to the lawyers indicating that he intended to hold that the Forest
Service was entitled to an instream flow right for fish purposes in the
Mimbres headwater creeks because the right was so high in the system
that no one could be hurt by it, a position that he stuck to over the next
couple of months of controversy. With respect to federal reserved rights
for recreational uses, Moise agreed with everyone at that point:
recreation was a use that gave rise to a reserved right. But when it came
time to actually produce what lawyers called Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law that would encompass the Special Master's decision,
there was trouble.
Some of the problems lay in what Moise described as "many
°4
delays and false starts" on his partY Some involved the highly technical
and detailed land descriptions that described both the land withdrawals
and reservations that had given birth to the Gila National Forest and
would date the implicit reservation of water that they spawned. But the
most nettlesome involved the problem of instream flow rights, slowly
rising to the surface of the litigation like a canker sore.
The Forest Service continued to update and amend its inventory
of uses. Simms himself had missed the first single reference to the
Forest's only instream flow claim. Now, in trying to reconcile the
technical descriptions of Forest uses for Moise, he discovered that the

102. Brief for the State of New Mexico, app. Exhibit lb et seq., United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77-510) (Partial Master Referee Report Covering All of the
Claims of the United States of America); Richard A. Simms, Speech to the Colorado State
Bar (Oct. 12, 1978) (in personal files of Judge Norman Hodges).
103. Interview with Stuart Shelton, supra note 16.
104. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77-510) app., at 135 (Letter
from Honorable Irwin S. Moise, Special Master, N.M. Dist. Ct., to Donald W. Redd,
Assistant Att'y Gen., State of N.M. & Richard A. Simms, Special Assistant Att'y Gen., State
of N.M. (Sept. 17, 1974)).
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most recent Forest Service inventory included two new instream flow
claims,105 bringing the total to three. Simms protested.
There followed in late 1974 and early 1975 yet another round of
briefs directed to the instream flow controversy. Simms' memorandum
in particular showed both a growing appreciation of the late nineteenthcentury history of Forest reservations and a rising outrage at the position
of the United States. 106 Special Master Moise responded by offering the
increasingly disputatious parties one last chance to argue orally the
instream flow issue in his Albuquerque office. 107 There Moise explained
once again that under the circumstances recognition of a reserved
instream flow right could not harm anyone, so why not recognize it?
Simms tried to tie Moise down to that, going so far as to suggest that the
United States would not have an instream flow right if it did any harm to
an appropriator under state law, essentially making the right disappear
if it was ever exercised. The suggestion raised yet another round of
debate. Moise stuck to his carefully trained guns, telling Simms and
Redd that he was only deciding the case before him and that, in the case
of the Mimbres, recognition of the three instream flow rights could not
108
harm anyone.
Finally, after all the debates, all the wrangling, on May 5, 1975,
almost two years after the two-hour trial, Special Master Moise issued
his report. The report listed the three instream uses finally claimed by
the United States and gave each a priority of March 2, 1899, the date of
the Forest Reservation. As he had said all along, he now found that these
instream flow rights could not interfere with upstream junior users
because there were none. 109
In the meantime, however, the part of Moise's decision dealing
with recreation as a basis for the federal reserved rights of the Forest
Service simply slid by. Ever since late 1972, when Simms conceded the
recreational issue, everyone assumed that in one form or another
recreation would be one of the Forest Service purposes for which a water
right would be implied. Every version, every draft of the Master's
105. Id. at 137-38 (Letter from Richard A. Simms, Special Assistant Att'y Gen., State of
N.M., to Honorable Irwin S. Moise, Special Master, N.M. Dist. Ct. (Nov. 22, 1974)).
106. Id. at 153-69 (State's Memorandum Brief, Jan. 31,1975).
107. Id. at 171 (Letter from Richard A. Simms, Special Assistant Att'y Gen., State of
N.M., to Honorable Irwin S. Moise, Special Master, N.M. Dist. Ct. (Feb. 24, 1975)
(confirming "the setting of March 6, 1975, for oral argument on the issue of minimum
instream flows")).
108. Id. at 137-38 (Letter from Richard A. Simms, Special Assistant Att'y Gen., State of
N.M., to Honorable Irwin S. Moise, Special Master, N.M. Dist. Ct. (Nov. 22, 1974)).
109. Id. at 190-99 (Special Master Irwin Moise Rep. dated May 2, 1975, filed May 5, 1975,
Referencing Findings of Fact 3, 4).
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decision proposed by the State or the United States, by Simms or Redd,
would have so found. Towards the end, Simms tried to distinguish
between "recreational uses incidental to hiking, fishing, camping and
hunting," the Aldo Leopold "recreational uses," and the "substantial
recreational reservoirs, winter sports facilities, and such other substantial
works involving large consumptive uses," the Bureau of Reclamation
dream-like uses about which Ranger Ritchey had testified at the hearing
in October 1972. In his ultimate report, filed May 5, 1975, Special Master
Moise bought the distinction but the State was still left with a modified
110
version of recreation as the basis for a federal reserved water right.
Initially, the State's lawyers were exclusively concerned with
Moise's resolution of the instream flow issue, but court rules gave them
only ten days to think about it. On May 15, 1975, they formally objected
to Moise's report on the grounds that he had erred as a matter of fact and
law when he recognized the limited instream flow rights that he had.
They did not complain about his recognition of limited recreation. The
objections brought the matter before District Judge Norman Hodges,
who had appointed Moise Special Master."'
All of a sudden the traditional relationship between Hodges and
Moise was reversed. For years, Supreme Court Justice Moise had heard
and decided appeals from New Mexico district judges like Norman
Hodges. Now Hodges, the district judge, was sitting in review of retired
Supreme Court Justice, now Special Master, Moise. The two men knew
each other from professional activities. Hodges had learned of Moise's
water decisions in the 1960s in the course of his own management of the
Gila-San Francisco adjudication and had great respect for Moise's water
wisdom. After the State had filed its objection and before he had decided
the appeal, Hodges ran into Moise at a bar function and mentioned the
State's appeal to him. Moise remarked that he could not understand
what the State was upset about, since his decision had very little to do
112
But
with water in the upper reaches of the Mimbres water shed.
role
the
with
concerned
Norman Hodges, unflappable as ever, was not
reversal and was not concerned with Moise's lack of concern. He knew
what his job was in reviewing the report of his special master, whoever it
might be, and he intended to do his job.
With respect to the instream flow issue, he had some new help.
In early January, 1976, Silver City attorney Wayne Woodbury,
representing the Phelps Dodge Corporation, asked the Court for
110. Id. at 198 (Special Master Irwin Moise Rep. dated May 2, 1975, filed May 5, 1975,
Referencing Conclusions of Law 11-12).
111. Id. at 200 (State's Objections to Master's Report, May 15, 1975).
112. See Interview with Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 28.
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permission to write a friend-of-the-court (amicus) brief in support of the
State's position that Special Master Moise had erred when he awarded
the Forest Service the three minimum-instream flow rights. After a
hearing, Hodges let Woodbury and Phelps Dodge into the case. 113
Special Master Moise had asked who could be hurt by
recognizing an instream right. In his brief, Woodbury showed that such
a right in the Gila National Forest, albeit on the Gila/San Francisco side
of the Continental divide and not on the Mimbres side, would be
disastrous to the operation of its large copper processing mill at Tyrone.
Phelps Dodge, then one of the largest employers in Grant County, had
invested a lot in the mill and "many millions of dollars" for the purchase
of more than 11,000 acre-feet per year of water rights with priorities
ranging from 1882 to 1961. And guess what? Phelps Dodge diverted that
Gila water above a large section of National Forest below. If the Forest
Service had instream flow rights below the Phelps Dodge mill diversion
and the priority of those rights was the 1899 reservation date of the
Forest, then the Forest Service could force Phelps Dodge to shut down
most of its diversion when the water got short in the Forest below in
order to leave water in the Gila. 114 Indeed, as recently as 1973, the Region
III Supervisor in Albuquerque had reminded Phelps Dodge that it might
require the mining company to shut down when Phelps Dodge had filed
for a permit to move irrigation rights that it had bought from below
some Forest land to above it. Now Woodbury attached the Forest Service
5
warning to his brief.11
The Phelps Dodge problem demonstrated the practical effect of
recognizing an instream flow right. It concretely answered Moise's
almost rhetorical question about who instream flow rights could
possibly hurt. The damaged party here was not in the Mimbres
watershed, but it was in the next one west, the Gila-San Francisco
watershed with which Judge Hodges was so familiar. And Phelps Dodge
was no small player in southwestern New Mexico, as everyone knew
113. Letter from J. Wayne Woodbury, Attorney, representing Phelps Dodge, to Jerry L.
Haggard, Attorney, Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes (Jan. 16, 1976) (in personal files of Judge
Norman Hodges); Letter from J. Wayne Woodbury, Attorney, Representing Phelps Dodge,
to Honorable Norman Hodges, Dist. J., State of N.M. (Jan. 27, 1976) (in personal files of
Judge Norman Hodges).
114. Brief for Phelps Dodge Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, Mimbres
Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (1965) (No. 6326) (in personal files of Judge
Norman Hodges).
115. Memorandum from Regional Forester William D. Hurst to the N.M. State Engineer
et al. (June 18, 1973) (advising Phelps Dodge that its application to move water rights from
the "Cliff Valley" below the national forest to the Bill Evans Reservoir above it could not
interfere with the "instream flow requirements necessary for fisheries") (in personal files of
Judge Norman Hodges).
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who was familiar with the still ruling domination of mining in the
economy of Luna County and New Mexico. Wayne Woodbury's amicus
appearance for Phelps Dodge did not add much to the intellectual
analysis of Forest Service reserved water rights, but it made up in
practical heft for whatever it lacked in legal argument.
The hefty legal arguments before Judge Hodges were left to
Simms and Redd. By now the two had gone around and around so many
times before Special Master Moise that their respective arguments
already had started to jell and emerge. Simms clearly was headed
toward nineteenth century land law as a critical factor in determining the
limited purposes of the National Forests; the 1897 Organic Act,
authorizing the establishment of National Forests and defining their
6
purposes, was emerging as the centerpiece of his argument." At the
same time, Simms' objection had expanded from the recognition of
instream flows to any recreational uses. Simms had conceded that point
in 1972. He had helped draft the Moise conclusion that Forest recreation
did deserve a reserved water right. He had not objected to that modest
recreational conclusion when he had appealed Special Master Moise's
instream flow findings to District Judge Hodges. Now he seemed to
broaden the category of his objection while he narrowed his focus on the
history. He ended the brief with what would become a constant refrain:
expanding Forest Service reserved water rights threatened to confiscate
state based water rights without compensation.
For his part, Redd started down the same historical road, a road
that would end up in the heart of the U.S. Supreme Court's ultimate
decision in the case. Now Redd suggested to Hodges that if the 1897 Act
really defined Forest purposes, then there were three purposes, not just
two as the state argued, and the first purpose, "to improve and protect
the forest within the boundaries," was broad enough to include instream
flows. "The word 'forest'," wrote Redd to Hodges, "includes more than
just the trees. It includes the entire ecosystem-the trees, the bushes and
other plant life, the decaying needles, the wood, etc., that make up the
7
forest community. See Webster's Unabridged Dictionary."" In a refrain
that would be repeated, word for word, in the Supreme Court's
dissent,11 8 the issue raised here by Redd, the precise meaning of a couple
of sentences in an 1897 statute, tried to ground the issue before Judge
Hodges in legal history.
116. Memorandum of Law at 17, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326) (in personal files
of Judge Norman Hodges).
117. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Special Master's Report at 8,
Salapek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326) (in personal files of Judge Norman Hodges).
118. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 721 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Before the objections to the decision of Special Master Moise
reached him, District Judge Hodges had not heard of any of this. He set
oral arguments for February 2, 1976. He thought seriously about
beginning the hearing by asking each of the parties for their definition of
the instream flow rights at the center of the controversy. 1' 9 Hodges had
never heard the term before in his experience with water law, thought
from the little that he had learned from the briefs that it was probably
anathema to the state law of prior appropriation that he knew so well as
a lawyer and judge, and believed he needed to know more about the
controversial idea. In the end, however, he decided to let the lawyers
have their say. No one transcribed the arguments, but Hodges kept notes
in a scraggly hand on long legal paper.120
Three lawyers argued that day that Special Master Moise had
been wrong in recognizing reserved instream flow rights for the Forest
Service. As so often happened in western water rights proceedings, U.S.
attorney Redd stood for the federal government alone. 121 Judge Hodges
was far too polite and dignified a judge to allow a hostile atmosphere
that day, but there was no question that U.S. attorney Don Redd was
outnumbered.
This time out, Simms as the lawyer for the party appealing went
first. According to Hodges' handwritten notes, Simms eventually
acknowledged that the United States had limited powers to reserve
water but hammered away at the fact that recreation and aesthetics had
not been among those purposes.
As he rose to respond for the United States, Redd must have
realized that Simms had just attacked a purpose of the Forest, recreation,
that Simms had accepted before. Redd challenged in two ways. He
berated Simms for changing positions and he emphasized that a "proper
perspective" would show that the Forest Service was only asking for a
little bit of water for fish and recreation. 122 In rebuttal, Simms pleaded
initial inexperience and reminded Judge Hodges that his decision would
119. See Interview with Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 28.
120. Handwritten notes of Honorable Norman Hodges, N.M. Dist. Ct. J. (Feb. 3, 1976)
(in personal files of Judge Norman Hodges).
121. The distribution was typical in state water proceedings in those days. Federal
attorneys would sit all alone on one side of rural western courtrooms packed by opposing
state and private attorneys and their hostile clients crowded into the other side. The Forest
Service attorneys loved to tell the story of two U.S. attorneys arriving for a water rights
hearing at a western slope Colorado courthouse (Eagle County, Colo.) packed with local
farmers and ranchers and attorneys. The water judge was supposed to have leaned over
the bench as the two foreign attorneys entered in front of the assembled local crowd and
welcomed each of them saying, "I see you brought a friend." Interview with Stuart Shelton,
supranote 16.
122. Handwritten notes, Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 120, at 3.
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set an important precedent for years to come for all National Forests no
matter how much water was involved. 123 The relationship between
Simms and Redd was collapsing as the gulf between their positions
widened.
In the end, however, Hodges recalls that it was as much the
arguments of the local private attorneys at the hearing that day that
swayed him. In particular, Phelps Dodge's Wayne Woodbury spoke only
briefly, but he reminded Hodges that the United States had stood by and
let Phelps Dodge buy millions of dollars worth of water rights only now
to claim what Woodbury called "an absolute power" to shut Phelps
Dodge down on the basis of a fishing and recreation right that no one
had ever guessed existed before. 124
Over the rest of February, Simms and Redd skirmished some
125
more about Simms' late change of position on the recreation issue. In
the meantime, Judge Hodges on three separate occasions sat down
himself and tried to draft an opinion of his own, analyzing the reserved
126
rights issues before him and explaining his resolution of them. As a
busy district judge, he was not obligated to go so far. His fellow district
judges rarely went to the trouble of drafting their own decisions,
preferring to adopt and alter, if necessary, the offerings of the lawyers
who had tried the case. (Hodges' aborted efforts, especially the initial
draft Memorandum Opinion, showed an incomplete understanding of
the relationship between state and federal law and solicitude for the
United States' dilemma in trying to protect fisheries even though it had
no reserved instream rights. Had Hodges adopted his own initial view of
events, the subsequent course of the litigation might have been quite
different. 127) "But I knew that this was an important case," he later told
me, "and I wanted to do it justice. In the end, I could never find the time
to finish any of the opinions that I started." 128
So on March 1, 1976, Judge Hodges just wrote Simms and Redd
a two-page letter. He told the two lawyers that he had considered their
123. Id. at 4.
124. Id. at 3.
125. Letter from Richard A. Sims, Special Assistant Att'y Gen., State of N.M., to
Honorable Norman Hodges, Dist. J., State of N.M. (Feb. 4 1976) (in personal files of Judge
Norman Hodges); See also Letter from Donald W. Redd to Honorable Norman Hodges,
supranote 89.
126. Norman Hodges, Memorandum Opinion (undated) (unpublished typed rough
drafts with additional handwritten notes. The last draft, with alterations and significant
deletions became the March 1, 1976, letter) (in personal files of Judge Norman Hodges).
127. The initial memorandum would have restricted state control over the designated
fisheries even as it denied the United States instream rights because they did not exist
under state law. Id.
128. See generally Interview with Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 28, at 10.
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"excellent" briefs. He noted that he had read a couple of articles on his
own. Most importantly, Hodges announced that he was ruling in favor
of the State's objections to Special Master Moise's report. He asked for
the opinions of the attorneys on the issues he had struggled with in his
own incomplete opinions. And, as was customary, Judge Hodges invited
the attorney for the prevailing side, Richard Simms, to draft the order
sustaining Simms' objections and modifying Moise's decision. 129 Simms
did so.
On March 26, 1976, Judge Hodges signed a new ten-page order
sustaining Simms and the State on the reserved rights issues. 13° The
signing was preceded and followed by months of squabbling between
Simms and Redd over the language of the new ruling and Simms'
naivete or perfidy, depending on perspective, in changing positions on
the different issues.131 Obviously, as Redd realized how narrow the
ruling would be with respect to Forest Service reserved rights, he became
more defensive and more desperate. It took all of April and all of May
that year to hear out the two positions. Finally, on June 4, 1976, Judge
Hodges washed his hands of the debate and filed the decision he had

made on March 26.132
The first eight pages, setting out the dates and the boundaries of
the Forest reservation in the Mimbres watershed, were factual, detailed,
technical, and not controversial except for what they did not say. It was
the ninth, tenth, and eleventh conclusions of law at the very end of
Hodges' order that caused trouble. In the ninth, Hodges held that, where
grazing permitees made use of water on the national forests, the
associated water rights belonged to the permitees, not the Forest Service.
In the tenth, Hodges held that recreation of any kind was not a purpose

129. Letter from Honorable Norman Hodges, Dist. J., State of N.M., to Richard A.
Simms, Special Assistant Att'y Gen., State of N.M. & Donald W. Redd, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
State of N.M. (Mar. 1, 1976) (in personal files of Judge Norman Hodges).
130. Order Sustaining Objections and Modifying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (1965) (No. 6326) (filed June 4,
1976, signed March 26, 1976) (in personal files of Judge Norman Hodges).
131. Letter from Richard A. Simms, Special Assistant Att'y Gen., State of N.M., to
Honorable Norman Hodges, Dist. J., State of N.M. (Mar. 5, 1976) (in personal files of Judge
Norman Hodges); Letter from Donald W. Redd, Assistant Att'y Gen., State of N.M., to
Honorable Norman Hodges, Dist. J., State of N.M. (Mar. 23,1976) (in personal files of Judge
Norman Hodges); Letter from Richard A. Simms, Special Assistant Att'y Gen., State of
N.M., to Honorable Norman Hodges, Dist. J., State of N.M. (Mar. 29,1976) (in personal files
of Judge Norman Hodges); Objections to Proposed Order, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (No. 6326)
(submitted by state engineer sustaining objections and modifying findings of fact and
conclusions of law) (on file with Natural Resources Journal).
132. Order Sustaining Objections and Modifying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 1, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (No. 6326) (on file with Natural Resources Journal).
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of the Forest and the Forest Service had no reserved rights for that.
Finally, in the eleventh conclusion of law Hodges flatly held that the
Forest Service had no rights to any minimum instream flows for fish
purposes or any purposes.133 There was no mistaking the tenor of the
Hodges' decision.
Just five days later, on June 7, 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court
issued its first ruling on implied federal reserved water rights since the
elliptical decision in Arizona v. California. In Cappaertv. United States,1M a
unanimous Supreme Court decided that the United States had reserved
rights for a pool in the Devil's Hole National Monument and that
reserved right was superior to subsequently established rights under
Nevada state law. Chief Justice Burger's opinion sometimes demonstrated an unclear understanding of western water law, 135 but the
outlines of his analysis solidified the doctrine that was at the heart of the
Gila National Forest dispute. The quantities of the federal reserved water
rights were to be minimal, but their priorities were real: the federal right
was superior to all subsequently established rights, but inferior to those
already established rights under state law. The purpose of the federal
reservation would determine both the existence and the extent and the
time of the federal right. Applied to the Mimbres case, Cappaert made it
clear that the history of the 1897 Organic Act was going to be even more
critical than anyone had yet guessed.
In any case, the Forest Service could not let Judge Hodges'
decision stand. Redd was convinced the decision was dead wrong. The
narrow view of Forest Service reserved rights would present real
difficulties for the Forest Service and the principles on which the
decision rested might have much wider effects, at least in New Mexico's
four other national forests. 136 On July 2, on the last day allowed, the
137
United States appealed to the state supreme court in Santa Fe.
Once again, the course of the litigation got confused and off
course. As the appealing party, the United States was responsible for
procuring the Sixth Judicial District Court record of proceeding for the
133. Id.
134. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
135. For example, Burger dubbed the water in the cavern "surface water" to avoid the
problem of whether the doctrine applied to ground water, called the reservation of water
explicit even though the 1952 act establishing the Monument referred to water but said
nothing about water rights, and said that it was impossible to specify a quantity for the
reserved water right since it did not involve the consumption of water. In fact the pupfish
sounded more like an endangered species, entitled to protection, not a water right. Id.
136. Letter from Donald W. Redd to Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 131; Letter
from Richard A. Simms to Honorable Norman Hodges, supranote 131.
406, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (No. 6326).
137. Transcript of Record, vol. Ill,
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state supreme court. On the same day that the United States appealed, it
requested that the clerk of the Luna County district court reproduce "the
complete record" and send it to the supreme court. 138 In response, the
Luna County district court clerk, Nadine Speir, asked if the United States
really wanted the thousands of pages of documents in the 900 subfiles in
the entire Mimbres adjudication. There was no way that she could
segregate the Forest Service documents. The specification of less than all
of the documents was up to the Forest Service. When the Forest Service
tried to specify those local documents pertaining to its claim, it ran into
more trouble. 139 In the end, the record sent to the state supreme court
was a chaotic, huge hodge-podge of mundane documents 140 and
important documents and irrelevant documents. The record filled five
volumes 141 and for the most part obscured what had begun with a very
short trial and ended with a very clear ruling.
The problem with the record went on causing problems through
the fall of 1976. The Luna County district clerk had trouble figuring out
what the United States wanted her to send to Santa Fe. The United States
had trouble complying with the timetable for the appeal. State Engineer
lawyer Richard Simms, aggressive enough to exploit the Forest Service's
problems, twice moved to have the appeal dismissed by the supreme
court and twice forced the state supreme court to hold a hearing on his
motions.' 42 In the end, the court was not willing to dispose of the appeal
on such technical grounds and what was still called Mimbres Valley
IrrigationCo. v. Salopek limped forward.
However, the procedural imbroglios did bring U.S. appellate
attorney Peter Steenland to the battleground. Assigned to the task of
writing the briefs and orally arguing the case that trial attorney Redd
had litigated and Judge Hodges had decided, Steenland found himself
first immersed in the procedural mess that the trial attorneys had created
with the record. In the late fall of 1976, Steenland even had to make an
emergency visit to Santa Fe from his home base in Washington to save
the appeal from Simms' attacks. 143 The state supreme court heard him
out about the difficulties with the record and let the case continue

138. Id. at 407.
139. Id. at 415.
140. For example, ten orders joining additional parties defendant as the stream system
adjudication progressed and new claimants were added to the overall list. The transcript of
the record proper included all the motions and orders to join additional defendants. Id. vol.
V, 139-40, 143-44, 151-52, 157-58, 160-61.
141. Id. Table of Contents.
142. Id. vol. III, at 419; id. vol. I, at 25.
143. Telephone Interview with Peter R. Steenland, supra note 4.
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despite Simms' objections. 144 It was the last thing that Steenland won in
the supreme court.
In the meantime, Steenland and a couple of assistants in the
appellate division of the attorney general's Land and Water Division
went to work on their basic brief to the state supreme court. They
brought a fresh eye to the issues that trial attorney Redd had struggled
with and a lot more experience to the appellate process. Before he retired
in 1992, Steenland would become one of the Land and Natural Resource
Division's most experienced appellate lawyers, appearing for the United
States by his own estimation in over 150 cases for the Department of
Justice in federal courts. 145 (Only "a handful" would involve state
appellate courts of the kind he faced in the Mimbres case.) The 28-page
brief-in-chief that Steenland filed just before Christmas 1976146 had a
polish to it that Redd's many previous memoranda lacked.
Surprisingly, however, the brief took essentially the same tack
that Redd always had: any lawful use of Forest Service land, including
recreation, wildlife, and instream flows, was authorized by the allimportant 1897 Organic Act and therefore brought with it reserved water
rights with the dates of the Gila National Forest reservation shortly after
1897. To shore up the basic point, Steenland went into much greater
depth than anyone previously had, showing that the Forest Service had
from the beginning administered the Gila and the Mimbres watershed
within it for recreational and wildlife purposes. (Aldo Leopold would
have agreed to that.)
Steenland's history missed the purpose/use distinction
emphasized by New Mexico and increasingly relied on the words of B.F.
Femow, the first head of forestry, who, in a long passage featured by
Steenland, in 1891 distinguished between "primary purposes" and
"secondary objects" of national forests. Of course, the "primary/
secondary" dyad that Steenland unwittingly trumpeted sounded a lot
like the "purpose/use" distinction on which Simms built his case. In the
ultimate U.S. Supreme Court decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist made
much of the distinction between the "primary" purposes of the National
Forests, which did imply reserved water rights, and the "secondary
purposes," which did not. 147 For the moment, in the first brief to the

144. Transcript of Record, vol. I, at 33, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (No. 6326).
145. Biography of Peter R. Steenland, at http://www.sidley.com/lawyers/bio.asp?
ID=S121074856 (last visited Sept. 23, 2005); Telephone Interview with Peter Steenland,
supra note 4.
146. Transcript of Record, vol. I, at 35, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (No. 6326) (Appellants Brief
in Chief filed Dec. 22, 1976).
147. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978).
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New Mexico Supreme Court, the United States just assumed that any
lawful use was a purpose sufficient to draw reserved water rights to it.
The job of answering Steenland fell, as it had from the beginning
of the case in 1972, to Richard Simms. He had written on the issue
frequently over the previous five years and his thinking had slowly
evolved. This time around he worked much harder on the brief. The fact
that he had to write it over Christmas and New Years, he said, actually
helped. State government was effectively shut down so there were many
fewer distractions. And State Engineer Reynolds, as much a workaholic
as Simms, was more available to help out.148
The answer brief Simms wrote over the holidays and filed on
January 10, 1977, focused on the history of the 1897 Forest Service
Organic Act as a measure of the Forest's reserved water rights. Brief after
brief, the history had grown incrementally. Still, working pretty much
alone, Simms felt that neither he nor anyone else had mastered the
history of what was a critical period in forest history between 1891 and
1897.149
Whatever this brief lacked in detailed history, however, it gained
in focus. Again and again in the brief, Simms returned to the distinction
between Forest purposes and Forest uses, the fundamental distinction
that State Engineer Reynolds had first pointed out to Simms in 1972.
Now in their discussions in Reynolds' corner office in the Bataan
Memorial Building in late 1976 and early 1977, Reynolds re-emphasized
the distinction and Simms built it into his January 1977 brief as a
fundamental building block in his basic argument that the 1897 Organic
Act limited the purposes for the establishment of national forests while it
authorized a very broad regulation of uses on them. Only the purposes,
not the uses, would give rise to federal reserved water rights and those
purposes did not include recreation, wildlife, or instream flows.
Way back in September, the United States had requested an oral
15°
argument before the state supreme court once the briefs were done.
The court set Monday, February 7, 1977, for the arguments and decided
which of the five justices would sit on the three-judge panel hearing the
case. When the lawyers arrived in the small, intimate supreme court
courtroom and found Justice H. Vern Payne, Chief Justice LaFel Oman,
and Justice Dan Sosa sitting at the judge's bench before them, Richard

148. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
149. Id.
150. Transcript of Record, vol. I, at 24, Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (No. 6326) (Request for Oral
Argument filed Sept. 2,1976).

1014

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

Simms took note even though the array would not mean much to out-of5
towner Peter Steenland.1 1
H. Vern Payne was the son of H. Vearle Payne with whom
Norman Hodges had begun the practice of law in Lordsburg in the late
1950s and from whom Hodges had learned his water law. Vern Payne
brought his father's interests in water law and his predilection for state
water law to which federal reserved rights were a narrow exception.
Chief Justice LaFel Oman would show his cards immediately after the
supreme court's decision in the Mimbres case when, as judge pro tem in
the Pecos River adjudication, he took an extremely narrow view of both
federal Indian and Forest Service reserved water rights.1 52 Only Justice
Dan Sosa was an unknown quantity on the court, but he was from
southern New Mexico and knew the Mimbres well.
Neither Simms nor Steenland remembers the details of the oral
argument that Monday morning. Simms remembers that the panel did
not ask that many questions but appeared sympathetic. He recalls
Steenland, who came to Santa Fe from Washington on the Sunday before
oral arguments and left on Tuesday, the day after, as being uncomfortable in the courtroom and anxious to leave. But Steenland felt no
hostility to the federal claims from the state high court. 153
In any case, immediately after the oral arguments were
concluded, the court formally announced that it would take the case
under advisement. Informally, the three justices quickly agreed that they
would affirm the decision of Judge Hodges, reject the appeal of the
United States, and write an opinion that hewed to the extremely narrow
view of federal reserved water rights for the Gila National Forest that
Simms and Reynolds had come to espouse. The three justices agreed that
Justice Payne would author the decision.
Everyone waited a long three months while Justice Payne and
his clerks assembled the opinion whose result they knew. Payne was
known as a conscientious supreme court justice and a fine writer. In his
own words, he often agonized over different cases, wondering what the
correct result should be. A couple of years before, Payne had decided
another case about whose result he had been pretty sure and the U.S.
Supreme Court had reversed him.154 But the Mimbres decision never
troubled him. The arguments of the United States, he later said, made no
151. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supranote 5.
152. State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (reviewing
decision of Judge Pro Tem LaFel Oman).
153. Telephone Interview with Peter R. Steenland, supra note 4.
154. Telephone Interview with Vern Payne, retired N.M. Sup. Ct. J., in Albuquerque,
N.M. Uune 16, 2005).
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sense to him. He knew what the result should be. 155 Between February
and May he set out to justify the result as best he could.
The decision, issued May 23, 1977, was only seven pages long
and was as clear as a bell. Supreme Court law, especially the recent
Cappaert case, wrote Payne, previously had decided that the United
States had reserved water rights "'in quantities reasonably necessary to
fulfill the purposes of the Gila National Forest. ' " 156 Now the New Mexico
court had to determine for what purposes the Gila National Forest was
originally established and whether those purposes necessarily required
an implied reservation of water. Payne was immediately back to the
Creative Act of 1891 and the Organic Act of 1897.
There he found that Congress authorized the creation of Forests
like the Gila for three purposes: improving and protecting the forest,
securing favorable conditions of water flows, and furnishing a
continuous supply of timber. The Forests, wrote Payne, could regulate
the occupancy and use of the Forests for recreation and for minimum
instream flows necessary for aesthetic, environment, recreation, and
"fish" purposes, but these were authorized uses, not themselves
purposes. As such, those uses could not be a basis upon which to imply
the federal reservation of water. In so holding, Payne had bought the
fundamental point that Reynolds had insisted on since 1972 and that
Simms had finally latched onto so clearly in his 1977 brief.
True, there were ambiguities in Payne's opinion. He had held
that "improving and protecting the forest" was an independent purpose
of federal forest reservation, perhaps capable of requiring an implied
reserved water right depending upon how "forest" was defined. If, for
example, the forest included "fish," as U.S. attorney Don Redd had
suggested to District Judge Norman Hodges, 157 well, then, maybe
protecting the forest did include the minimum flows necessary for the
Gila River trout. Simms had tried as hard as he could to keep Payne
away from that gaping possibility and in the end he had failed.
But the decision represented a clear victory for New Mexico and
a clear blow to a Forest Service looking for water rights to move it
toward a more ecological stewardship of its resources and an increased
focus on recreation as its mission. At the time, court decisions from
across the west on forest service reserved water rights were drifting in

155. Interview with Don Klein, former Special Assistant Att'y Gen., in Socorro, N.M.
(Feb. 2,2004).
156. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615, 616-17 (1977) (quoting
Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340,350 (1964)).
157. Handwritten notes of Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 120.
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from different directions. 158 None was quite as final as Justice Payne's
decision in what was still called Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek.
Most were no more favorable. Perhaps it was time to find out once and
for all if Forest Service water rights in 1980 really depended on what
Congress had implied between 1891 and 1897. With Payne's decision in
hand, the United States now had to decide whether to go back into the
future with respect to what Congress had intended.
IV. "THIS IS ONE OF THOSE RARE CASES EVOKING EPISODES
IN THIS COUNTRY'S HISTORY THAT, IF NOT FORGOTTEN, ARE
1 59
REMEMBERED AS DRY FACTS AND NOT AS ADVENTURE."
Richard Simms fully expected the United States to try to appeal
the New Mexico Supreme Court's May 1976 Mimbres decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court. He hoped that it would, so sure had he become that he
was right on an issue that he had worked on for more than four years
and on which he already had beaten the United States twice. But it took
the various federal officers awhile to decide whether they wanted to take
on the case. A new president, Jimmy Carter, had taken office, and it took
time to appoint new lieutenants. First, Judge Griffin Bell, like Carter a
southerner, became the new Attorney General. Then, President Carter
and Attorney General Bell had to pick a new Assistant Attorney General
for Land and Natural Resources. The decision whether to appeal what
was still called Mimbres Irrigation District v. Salopek et al. would fall to
them and to the new Solicitor General, Wade McCree. 16
The deadline for petitioning for a writ of certiorari from the U.S.
Supreme Court to the New Mexico Supreme Court fell due late in the
summer of 1977. Rather than hurry, the new administration asked for an
extension until that fall. On August 11, 1977, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
William Rehnquist, in the first of many critical decisions he would make
in the Mimbres case, extended the deadline until October 3.161
By then the new administration had found its new Assistant
Attorney General for Land and Water, James Moorman. From the point
of view of New Mexicans, Moorman was a nightmare come true.
158. Brief of Petitioner at 30, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77510) (listing pending adjudications suits in federal and state courts where Forest Service
water rights were at issue).
159. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669 (1979) (Justice Rehnquist's
opening sentence).
160. Interview with James Moorman, Former Assistant Att'y Gen. for Land & Water, in
Washington, D.C. (July 21, 2004).
161. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No.
77-510).
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President Carter and Attorney General Bell picked Moorman because he
was a southern environmental lawyer with connections to both the Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund and the Environmental Defense Fund. Carter,
Bell, and Moorman shared close personal and political connections to the
Georgia Nature Conservancy. 62 Moorman fit Carter's bill. But what
were virtues to Carter were vices to Reynolds and Simms: Moorman was
not from the West; he had not been schooled in the state-based, federally
approved doctrine of prior appropriation that Westerners found so
threatened by expansive reserved water rights for the National Forests. 163
Moorman had begun his legal career as an opponent of the
Forest Service's perceived devotion to resource extraction in the 1960s
and 1970s, becoming one of the first lawyers to use the Forest Service's
own regulations to halt some of the worst timber sales in the Pacific
Northwest. 164 Moorman had attracted attention when, between 1972 and
1974, he had spearheaded the first successful and controversial effort to
shut down Forest Service clear cutting in the National Forests.
Using the same 1897 statute at the heart of United States v. New
Mexico, Moorman and his Sierra Club Legal Defense cohort had
successfully stopped Forest Service clear cutting in the Monongahela
National Forest near his home state of North Carolina. 165 Moorman had
convinced the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that
the specific narrow provisions of the 1897 Organic Act still controlled
logging 75 years later. Now, as newly appointed Assistant Attorney
General for Land and Water, Moorman had switched sides and
positions. He was defending the Forest Service and arguing for a broad
definition of reserved water rights under the 1897 statute, a reading that
served instream flows, not clear cutting. Moorman wanted to appeal the
New Mexico Supreme Court's decision.
The Forest Service itself agreed. Department of Agriculture
lawyers and water rights specialists had been itching to get some final
(and better, they hoped) resolution of the Forest Service reserved rights
issue that had been roiling around the federal and state courts of the
West. United States v. New Mexico looked to them like the first and best
shot. 166 With both the Department of Justice and the Department of
Agriculture agreed on the appeal, the new Solicitor General, Wade

162. Interview with James Moorman, supra note 160.
163. Moorman, who was based in San Francisco, participated in the Eagle County case.
He had been around western water rights. Id.
164. WILKINSON, supranote 12, at 183 (illustrating the "Big Build Up").
165. W. Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 422 (D.C.
W. Va. 1973), affirmed by 552 F 2d. 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
166. Interview with Stuart Shelton, supra note 16.
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McCree, who had the ultimate say, went along. On October 3, 1977,
Moorman, with the help of two new attorneys, filed the request by the
United States that the Supreme Court review the decision of the New
Mexico Supreme Court.
Moorman's October 3 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was meant
to get the Supreme Court to accept the United States' appeal of the New
Mexico decision, not necessarily win it. But Moorman did do his best to
convince the Supreme Court to take the case on the basis of its specific
importance and its general application. "(T)he New Mexico Supreme
Court," wrote Moorman, "has cut off water to 7,793,195 acres of national
forest land within that state for any purpose other than 'to insure
favorable conditions of water flow and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber.'" 167 He pointed out that the same issue was plaguing eight other
proceedings involving 17 other national forests across the west. "The
mischief," he concluded, of the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision,
"once done, cannot easily be undone." 168
In addition, argued Moorman, the New Mexico Supreme Court
had been dead wrong in distinguishing "purposes" and "uses." The
court in Cappaert v. United States had not intended, he continued, "to
limit the federal government's reserved water rights to the primary
purposes (sic) of a reservation of public lands, thereby foreclosing for
lack of water all secondary purposes that were within the original
contemplation of Congress." 169 (Of course, statements like this just
emphasized again the kind of hierarchy of purposes and uses that led to
the argument's demise. 170 )
For the moment, Simms, still working on his own and near
another holiday (this time Thanksgiving), would have none of it. He
accused Moorman of misrepresenting the facts presented before Special
Master Moise. He wrote that "the United States distorts and hyperbolizes
the significance of the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision.... "171 And,
he said, the State and the state supreme court had been right about the
legislative history of the 1897 Organic Act, a history that the United
States just disregarded rather than refuted. Formally, Simms opposed the
United States' petition; he argued against the Supreme Court's taking the

167. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No.
77-510).
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id. at 16 n.12.
170. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., discussing
primary and secondary purposes).
171. Brief of Respondent at 5, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No. 77-510).
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case. But he was just itching for a good fight and if it was in the Supreme
Court, well, so much the better. 172
The U.S. Supreme Court met in conference in early January 73 to
decide whether to allow the United States' appeal and give Simms his
chance. There were many petitions to consider, the great majority of
which would be rejected. 174 In the developing Supreme Court practice of
the day, most of the justices agreed to share their clerks and jointly
assign the job of writing one memorandum assessing the importance of
the case to one clerk. 175 In early December 1977, after the petitions by the
United States and the responses by Simms had all come in, the job of
summarizing fell to Tom Campbell, one of four clerks to Justice William
Brennan.
On December 8, 1977, he circulated his "preliminary memorandum" to the chambers of the other justices.176 The memorandum tried
to describe the course of the litigation in New Mexico and the issues
raised there. But the memorandum hopelessly confused federal reserved
rights, state based rights under the doctrine of prior appropriation, and
the possible and real conflicts between the two.177 Campbell did
acknowledge that "water rights in the Western States particularly are
matters of critical concern" as evidenced by other pending Supreme
Court cases involving western water. However, on balance, Campbell
recommended that the court not take United States v. New Mexico until
the pending cases all over the West had developed the issue more
fully.178 On receiving the pooled memorandum, at least one clerk to
another Supreme Court justice added some handwritten notes. 179 But
basically, when the Supreme Court members met on January 6, 1978,
they had only Campbell's memorandum to go on.

172. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
173. BLACKMUN, supranote 1.
174. Thurgood Marshall, Personal Papers, Library of Congress Gan. 9, 1978) (Order List
indicates that 6 petitions for certiorari were granted and 191 denied).
175. BLACKMUN, supra note 1, Introduction, at 7 (discussing certiorari memoranda,
1968-1993).The certiorari pool practice was established in 1972. A single clerk's
memorandum summarizing the cases was circulated to all judges who participated in the
"cert. pool." Justice Blackmun participated in the pool. Id.
176. BLACKMUN, supra note 1, Box 274, Folder 3 (Preliminary Memorandum, Conference
of January 6,1978).
177. Id. Box 274, Folder 3, at 6-8 (the memorandum refers to U.S. claims as based on
prior appropriations when in fact they are fundamentally based on implied reservations of
water).
178. Id. Box 274, Folder 3, at 8-9.
179. Id. Box 274, Folder 3, app. (Preliminary Memorandum, Dec. 8, 1977; Notes by Keith
Ellison, clerk to Justice Blackmun).
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At that meeting, the justices considered the petition for certiorari
to the New Mexico Supreme Court. There was a short discussion and a
vote followed. Despite the doubts raised by the clerks, seven justices
unequivocally voted to grant the petition and hear the case. Justice
Powell, who, as it turned out, had the greatest concern with the wildlife
issues raised by the New Mexico decision,180 abstained. Most
surprisingly of all, Justice Rehnquist, who as a westerner familiar with
water and as one of the courts most avid backers of state-based rights,
especially in resource conflicts with the federal government, was the
only justice of nine to vote against hearing the case.18 ' Justices Powell
and Rehnquist lost, and on January 9, 1978,182 the U.S. Supreme Court
formally granted the United States' petition and agreed to review the
New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in the Court's 1978 October
Term.
It promised to be a busy and controversial Term. Big cases
involving fundamental social issues like affirmative action in higher
education were before the court. 8 3 A claim that water was a discoverable
mineral under the 1872 Mining Act involved basic water resource issues
under federal law. 184 Another case from the central valley of California
raised essential issues about the relationship of the state and federal
governments' control of reclamation projects.18s When United States v.
New Mexico joined California v. United States on the October 1978
Supreme Court docket, it looked as if that Term would yield some
crucial decisions with respect to state and federal power over western
water.
In United States v. New Mexico, Assistant Attorney General
Moorman and the Solicitor General's office, as the appealing party, had
to file the opening brief. Moorman began by familiarizing himself with
the issues in detail and by assembling a team of researchers and writers.
Members included lawyers from his own Department of Justice Land
and Water Division, from the Solicitor General's office, and from the
solicitor's office of the Department of Agriculture and its Forest
180. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 719 (1978) (Powell, J. dissenting).
181. BLACKMUN, supra note 1, in Dockets, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978) (op. cit. chart showing votes on certiorari).
182. Id.
183. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
184. Andrus v. Charlestone Products Co., 436 U.S. 604 (1978).
185. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). This case was granted certiorari
during the October 1977 Term but was not placed on the docket until the October 1978
Term. United States v. New Mexico and California v. United States started on separate tracks
but were later paralleled and the decisions were written together and issued
simultaneously.

Fall 2005]

FOREST SERVICE WATER RIGHTS

1021

Service. 186 At the meetings, the lawyers discussed the issues, many for
the first time, and divvied up the work. They recognized that a lot of it
would involve the early history of the Forest Service and they tried to
parcel that out too. Stuart Shelton, a then young lawyer in the
Department of Agriculture, remembers drawing the task of looking at
the grazing leases from the early Aldo Leopold days on the Gila National
Forest, trying to determine what exactly they said about federal and state
187
rights to water.
Meanwhile, back in New Mexico, Richard Simms made a choice
that some said changed the course of the litigation in the Supreme
Court. 18 Up until then, Simms had done himself almost all the historical
and legal investigation in the entire Mimbres case. Now he realized that
the case really would turn on the history of forest reserves between 1891
and 1897. Like the lawyers for the United States, Simms had toyed with
what he had come to realize was an incredibly complex series of events
in the last decade of the nineteenth century about which no one knew
enough. He decided to assign the task of investigating the history in
189
depth to a new lawyer in the State Engineer's office, Don Klein.
Klein was an extremely bright, slightly eccentric attorney who
had come to the State Engineer Office, like Simms, on the recommendation of a New Mexico appellate judge for whom Klein had clerked. Klein
had grown up in Albuquerque's North Valley, gone to a public high
school there known even then for the incredible diversity of its student
body, and by chance headed off to the University of Chicago for his
undergraduate training. He had returned to New Mexico, started law
school, dropped out to work for a while on the Navajo Reservation, and
finally finished. By the time he went to work for Simms, his
unconventional life had slipped a couple of notches. He was living in Los
Alamos with his first wife and her two kids, commuting the 40
dangerous mountain miles to Santa Fe to work, and struggling, as he did
much of his adult life, with alcohol. Klein appreciated Simms'
assignment to him because he loved research and it fit his flexible
lifestyle and the long, irregular working hours he put in.190
In the late fall and early winter of 1977-1978, Klein began to
explore the history of the origins of the Forest Service. He quickly found
that not much academic work had been published on it. In the 1920s,
186. Interview with Stuart Shelton, supranote 16.
187. Id.
188. Telephone Interview with Peter Thomas White, Retired Chief Counsel, N.M. State
Eng'r (Sept. 9, 2003).
189. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
190. Interview with Don Klein, supra note 155.

1022

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

John Ise had written The United States Forest Policy, a book based on the
Congressional Record but focused as a Progressive-period history on
timber thievery, not water policy. 191 In 1967, Roderick Nash had devoted
a chapter to Aldo Leopold in his monumental Wilderness and the American
Mind, focusing on Leopold's early work in the Gila with recreation and
wilderness, which, as Nash told it, involved opposite sides of the same
vision. 192 Finally, in 1976, a year before Klein went to work in earnest, the
University of Washington Press, in conjunction with the Forest History
Society,193 published Harold Steen's The U.S. Forest Service: A History.
However, by Steen's own account, his U.S. Forest Service hardly dealt in
detail with the actions in Congress between 1890 and 1897, a subject that
Steen would return to in 1990,194 1991,195 1992,196 and 2005,197 too late to
help the Supreme Court or Klein in 1978. Don Klein was pretty much on
his own.
Harold Steen later wrote that the legislative history of the
National Forests and what Congress intended in reserving them under
the purposes of the 1897 Act at the heart of United States v. New Mexico
"is both voluminous and complex, and tracing a particular thread
requires great patience and more than a little detective skill."198 At the
start, Klein did not know it, but between 1871 and 1897, Congress would
consider nearly 200 bills concerned in some way with forests on western
public lands. 199 Each had its own usually incomplete history. It was very
difficult to discern an overall picture. With no guidelines at all and
nothing more than a quick intellect, a tireless passion for research, and a
quirky schedule, Klein dove into the task, starting with the
Congressional Record for the decade and letting it lead him where its
191.

JOHN ISE, THE UNITED STATES FOREST POLICY (1920).

192. Roderick Nash, Aldo Leopold: Prophet, in WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 182,
189-91 (3d ed. 1982).
193. "The Forest History Society is a non-profit, educational institution dedicated to the
advancement of historical understanding of human interaction with the forest
environment." See STEEN, supra note 9, at iv. This organization is partially funded by the
Forest Service, but independent of it.
194. Transcript of Dr. Harold Steen Testimony, 131-39, Concerning the Application for
Water Rights of: The United States of America for Reserved Water Rights in the Platte
River in Boulder, Clear Creek, Douglas, El Paso, Gilpin, Jefferson, Larimer, Park and Teller
Counties. (Arapahoe, Pike, Roosevelt and San Isabel National Forests) (1990) (Case No. W8439-76 etc.).
195.

HAROLD K. STEEN, U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV. THE BEGINNING OF THE

NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM, at FS-499 (1991).
196. ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS: A CENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM (Harold K. Steen
ed., 1992).
197. Harold K. Steen, The Forest Service OrganicAct, 103 J. FORESTRY 234, 234-36 (2005).
198. See Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Steen, supra note 194, at 4.
199. Id. at 3.
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debates and its references to bills and committee reports and other
administrative documents might take him.
Luckily, Klein found just the place to do his work, at the New
Mexico Supreme Court library in Santa Fe, across the street from his
State Engineer Office in the Bataan Memorial Building and down the hall
from the courtroom where Justice H. Ven Payne had listened to Peter
Steenland and Richard Simms argue the Mimbres case. The supreme
court law library was a federal repository, 2°° so it had all the documents
that the complete set of the Congressional Record might refer to. The law
library was open long hours so it could accommodate Klein, who often
arrived at work at 11 in the morning and sometimes did not leave until
dawn the next day, much to the chagrin of State Engineer Steve Reynolds
and, by proxy, Richard Simms. The law library was open stack and so
Klein could wander the well polished third floor alcoves late at night,
seeing what was there, pulling down obscure documents from high
metal shelves as they struck his fancy. The supreme court law library
had a quirky collection, supplementing its comprehensive federal
collection with a random sample of hard-to-find federal land documents,
usually contributed to the library by a New Mexico bar deeply entangled
in all of the New Mexico land imbroglios that had gone on for a long
20
time. 1
In his research Klein used all of these resources. He kept
elaborate Congressional Record indexes, written by hand on long yellow
legal pads, cross-referenced to all of the other federal documents to
which they referred. Late one winter night, he was wandering down an
alcove, reached up to the top shelf of a row of Interior Board of Land
Appeals Decisions, and pulled down a thin volume bound in ancient
green leather. He opened it and found himself in a 1903 "Compilation of
Laws, and Regulations and Decisions Thereunder, Relating to the
Establishment of Federal Forest Reserves Under Section 24 of the Act of
20 2
March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), and the Administration Thereof."
The volume had been published by the Department of the
Interior's General Land Office in 1903. It pulled together documents
from every federal source, from statutes to amendments, to rules and
regulations governing forest reserves, to Interior Circulars, to

200.
2004).
201.

Telephone Interview with Jack Blum, Retired N.M. Sup. Ct. Law Librarian (Mar. 8,
Id.

202. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, GEN. LAND OFFICE, COMPILATION OF LAWS, AND REGULATIONS
AND DECISIONS THEREUNDER, RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERAL FORESr
RESERVES, UNDER SECTION 24 OF THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1891 (26 STAT., 1095), AND THE
ADMINISTRATION THEREOF 14-15 (1903).
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administration letters. It happened to be in the New Mexico Supreme
Court library because Santa Fe lawyer Richard H. Hanna, a veteran of
many a land war in New Mexico and in the late 1910s the especially
controversial U.S. attorney for struggling New Mexico Pueblos, 2 3 had
donated the volume to the library in the 1920s. (A computer search
would have shown copies of it in the bowels of the Library of Congress
and the Department of the Interior, 2 4 but computer data bases were not
available in 1978.) Weeks of work in the National Archives might
eventually have led to the different sources gathered in the volume, but
Klein literally had stumbled on it in the New Mexico Supreme Court
Law Library.
When he opened it up and started reading, he stumbled again on
a printed copy of the "Regulations Governing Forest Reserves under the
Act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 34-36). Issued by the General Land Office of
the Department of the Interior on April 4, 1900, the regulations began:
Object of Forest Reservation.
2. "Public forest reservations are established to protect and
improve the forests for the purpose of securing a permanent
supply of timber for the people and insuring conditions
favorable to continuous water flow." 205
Here was exactly the point that Simms and New Mexico Supreme Court
Justice Payne had tried to make: improving and protecting the forest was
not an independent purpose for creating national forests from which a
court could imply a federally reserved water right. Instead, protection
and improvement served two other fundamental purposes -timber and
water supply -and it was only these independent purposes that would
yield the reserved water rights at issue in the case. And it was the
Department of the Interior officially making the point in 1900, only a
couple of years after the statute setting forth the purposes for which
forest lands could be reserved had been passed. Klein seized on the
language as he had seized on the volume and passed it on to Simms.
(Simms, of course, passed it on to the U.S. Supreme Court and it became
one of the foundations in Justice Rehnquist's opinion.)

203.

G. EMLEN HALL, FOUR LEAGUES OF PECOS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE PECOS GRANT,

1800-1933, at 219 (1984).
204. Library of Congress Online Catalog, http://catalog.loc.gov, (go to Library of
Congress Online Catalogue, Ic control no. 08035600, call no. SD426.A5 1903) (last visited
Oct. 27, 2005); Dep't of Interior Library Catalog, http://library.doi.gov/catalog.html (go to
the Dep't of Interior Library catalogue call no. KF5631.A3 1903) (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
205. See DEP'T OF INTERIOR, GEN. LAND OFFICE, supra note 202, at 15 (emphasis added).
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The discovery of the 1900 regulations was only one of many
serendipitous finds that Klein made in his investigation. As he worked,
he cast a wider and wider net. He researched late nineteenth century law
on national parks to see how parks and forests differed. Klein found by
chance a statute establishing a Midwestern national forest that explicitly
referred to protection of water resources on the forest. He researched the
many battles over the reservation of reservoir sites. He looked at statutes
granting rights-of-way across the forests for holders of state-based water
rights who wanted to locate their diversions high on streams in the
national forests. Then Klein extended that to the late nineteenth century
206
departmental decisions interpreting the right-of-way statutes.
In the process Klein made some amazing discoveries. For
example, he unearthed an early 1894 Interior Department decision
holding that the 1891 Act "would seem to relegate the matter of
appropriation and control of all natural sources of water supply in the
state of California to the authority of that state." 207 As soon as he read it,
he realized what he had discovered and raced from the Supreme Court
library across the street to the Bataan Memorial Building where he found
Reynolds and Simms. "Look what I found," he yelled, waving the
ancient document in his hand, startling the two. "Rehnquist is going to
08
love this."2
So it went with Klein and his historical research. The documents
deepened. The related subjects expanded. The analytic memos
lengthened. Klein's conviction that Hodges and Payne and Simms and
Reynolds had been correct about the history became firmer and firmer
the deeper into the history he went. But that conviction became more
and more rooted in the overriding concern of the New Mexico defenders
with state and federal power over water. In the 1920s, good progressive
John Ise had filtered the legislative processes through the lens of private
resource exploitation of public forests. Now Klein viewed it through the
late 1970s western state pre-occupation with state prerogatives over
water originating on federal lands. Ise clearly had missed something.
Klein may have too, but it was not for lack of hard research in the
original Forest Service documents.
In the spring of 2004, I went to see Don Klein in Socorro, New
Mexico, where he now lives and practices law, to find out what he
remembered about that time and that work. Klein lives alone in an old
building on the main drag through bedraggled Socorro. An old wooden
sign hangs from the front door heralding the "Law Office and
206.
207.
208.

Interview with Don Klein, supra note 155.
Right of Way-Canals-StateControl, 18 PUB. LANDS DECISIONS 573, 574 (1894).
Interview with Don Klein, supra note 155.
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Administrative Headquarters of Don Klein Jr." His house doubles as his
law office these days and there are literally books everywhere, in the
bathroom, in the kitchen, so many in the bedroom that it is hard to see
how he can make his way to his bed at night. He has had a hard life in
the 26 years since he worked on the legislative history for Simms. But
even today he remembers the particulars of that work, still can recite
chapter and verse from the 1891-1897 history he assembled in 1977-1978.
And he is as convinced today as he became then that New Mexico's take
on the history was correct. "I gained," he recalls, "the greatest respect for
the understanding of those western congressmen. They knew what was
at stake in the battle over water on the national forests, even in advance
of those court decisions that created the doctrine of implied federal
reserved water rights, and they protected those interests magnificently."209
Because the United States had appealed the decision of the New
Mexico Supreme Court, it went first in its brief to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Everybody in New Mexico-Simms, Klein, Reynolds, and the rest
of the State Engineer crew -waited to see what the United States would
know about Klein's history. It turned out very little.
The opening Supreme Court brief for the United States 210 had the
hard analytic surface of glass. There were, of course, three, not just two,
"purposes" in creating National Forests like the Gila and all express
purposes implied the need for water. The independent purpose of
improving and protecting the forest "subtended" the other two
purposes, argued the Assistant Attorney General Moorman, and gave
rise to the reserved rights for recreation, for minimum instream flows,
and for grazing rights the New Mexico Supreme Court had refused to
recognize.
In making that argument, Moorman concentrated on the
language of the 1897 Organic Act itself. He included very little of the
surrounding history that Klein had so immersed himself in. In fact, the
brief mentioned almost nothing about what had happened between the
1891 Creative Act and the 1897 Organic Act. It mentioned almost nothing
about the federal-state conflict over water control that Klein said had
dominated the debate during the period. Instead, Mormon and his
cohort went the way of syntax, arguing that Congress had authorized
many lawful purposes when it passed the 1897 Act. Those "secondary
purposes," they wrote, implied the reservation of water as surely as
watershed and timber protection.

209.
210.

Id.
Brief of Petitioner, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77-510).
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New Mexico, in its Answer Brief, March 31, 1978,211 filled the
gap with Klein. By then his research had filled several loose-leaf
notebooks with memoranda on different topics; extensive, esoteric
citations to obscure material; and cross references to an ever-wider range
of related topics. Simms had to assign a law clerk then in his employ just
to cull and organize the material. 2 2 Ultimately, the New Mexico brief
ended up citing 38 federal and state statutes dating from 1817 to 1973; 24
House documents and bills, mostly dating from between 1890 and 1897;
13 Senate documents from the same period; and 41 separate references to
the Congressional Record. 213 Klein was convinced that the history buffs
on the court would love the detail and that the weight of that
labyrinthine evidence showed that indeed Congress had very clearly
meant to restrict federal Forest Service water claims to the restrictive two
purposes finally named by Judge Payne in the New Mexico court
decision.
Simms was convinced that Klein's research simply weighed too
much. "We needed that detail," he later recalled, "but nobody, surely not
the Supreme Court, but not even their clerks, would wade through that
stuff. So I had to find another way. And I did it by writing a sort of
introductory section that was short and to the central point."214 "As a
practical matter," wrote Simms, "to the extent that reserved rights are
recognized, rights created and vested under state law may be
diminished." It was not just that the federal reserved rights doctrine took
away what states thought that Congress had relegated to the states'
plenary control. Worse, appropriators under state law had no notice of a
competing federal claim to water until 1963. Thus, they believed, prior to
then, that water was available to make their appropriations and "they
could not have reasonably expected that a paramount (Forest Service)
interest in the same water might be claimed in the future." A new Forest
Service appropriation, for example for recreation purposes would take
the priority of the original creation of the Gila (1899), "effectively taking
without compensation all (state law) rights predicated upon intervening
uses." 215 Klein's endless history, cast as a nineteenth century
state/federal conflict, came home to roost in a threatened federal
twentieth century taking of state-based property rights. No wonder that
211. Brief for the State of New Mexico, app. Exhibit lb et seq., United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77-510).
212. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
213. Brief for the State of New Mexico, at iii-xii, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S.
696 (No. 77-510).
214. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
215. Brief for the State of New Mexico, pt. 1, 10-18, United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. 696 (No. 77-510).
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Congress had sharply limited the purposes of Forests, as Klein's history
showed. And no wonder that, according to New Mexico, the Supreme
Court had to confirm that limitation in 1978.
In its final short reply brief,216 the United States did not quarrel
with any of Klein's long history at all. It only argued again that the 1897
Organic Act indeed authorized improvement and protection of the forest
as an independent federal purpose for their creation, essentially
emphasizing the fact that the federal government had never abandoned
its conservation interest in the reserved forests even as it was setting
them aside to protect timber and irrigation flows. The reply brief did not
say so in so many words, but the United States was suggesting that both
Klein and Simms had gone overboard in their view of this history as
exclusively about relative state and federal control of forest water
resources. As for Simms's opening suggesting that expanding federal
reserved water rights would reach back and take existing state created
rights, the United States called the claim "alarmist." To prove it, they
attached a letter to their brief from Chief Forester John R. McGuire,
claiming that the Forest Service reserved rights were "modest" by any
measure and almost certainly at their most expansive less than one
217
percent of the water produced by the forests.
That gratuitous assertion satisfied no one, least of all the two
New Mexico mining companies and one Colorado reservoir company
who were so concerned about Forest Service claims that they each went
to the trouble of filing briefs of their own 218 in support of New Mexico in
a case in which they were not even parties. The Molybdenum
Corporation of America (Molycorp) from the Red River, north of Taos,
New Mexico, and Phelps Dodge from the Gila River in New Mexico,
both large and powerful southwestern mining companies, held land and
water rights upstream from reserved forest land. Here were two entities
who could prove that Simms was right, that recognizing new Forest
Service instream rights in stretches of the river below the mines would
take essential waters from their operations.
The Colorado reservoir company, Twin Lakes Reservoir and
Canal, brought a similar position to the Supreme Court litigation and a
superb new lawyer, John U. Carlson, as well. A Rhodes Scholar from

216. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No. 77510).
217. Id. app. la (Letter from John R. McGuire, Chief, USDA Forest Serv., to James W.
Moorman, Assistant Att'y Gen. (Apr. 19, 1978)).
218. Brief for Respondent, Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Molycorp, Inc., United
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No. 77-510); Brief for Respondent, Brief Amicus Curiae
of Phelps Dodge Corp., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No. 77-510).
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Montana, Carlson had established himself as a pre-eminent water lawyer
in Colorado. 219 As an amicus on the side of New Mexico in United States
v. New Mexico, he brought to the Supreme Court litigation another real
client who would be damaged by an expansive federal reserved water
right for the Forest Service and an intellectual patina of his own. The
brief 220 that Carlson filed on April 3, 1978, in support of New Mexico
sparkled with elegant phrases and imaginative slants on the basic
arguments. (Carlson almost went too far when he first suggested that the
Forest Service did not need water rights to accomplish its goals. It
already had enough uncontested land use controls to better accomplish
those goals. This argument, as we shall see, was first picked up again in
1990 and then finally in 2004, with final ironic results. 221)
Finally, New Mexico was also joined in an amicus brief filed by
every other state west of the One Hundredth Meridian. 222 Simms, as one
of the New Mexico representatives to the Western States Water Council,
had lobbied hard there for participation by other member states. It was
not easy, he later reported, to get all of the states to agree on anything,
but on this one they were unanimous and in favor of New Mexico. That
final amicus brief, signed by ten western states, made up in breadth for
whatever it lacked in depth. Like the other amicii briefs filed in support
of the New Mexico position, the brief of the western states could not
match the Klein history, but it counted for as much by virtue of
unanimity that it demonstrated.
Only one amicus brief arrived on the side of the United States
and it came, not surprisingly, from the National and local Wildlife
Federation.223 Writing for the two organizations, attorney Patrick
Parenteau insisted that the 1897 Organic Act's reference to improving

219. John U. Carlson was a water law legend in his own time. He grew up on a sheep
ranch in eastern Montana, graduated in 1962 from the University of Montana, and won a
two-year Rhodes Scholarship in that year. On his return from England, he matriculated at
the Yale Law School from which he graduated in 1967. Over the next 25 years he practiced
water law out of Denver, Colorado, representing a variety of water users including
irrigators from the San Luis Valley. In the process of his work he won a reputation as
knowing more about Colorado's role in the Rio Grande Compact than any man alive. A
rare blood disease tragically ended his life prematurely in 1992.
220. Brief for Respondent, Brief of Amici Curiae, The Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal
Company and the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, United States v.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No. 77-510).
221. Id. at 34-35.
222. Brief for Respondent, Amici Curie Supporting Respondents, United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No. 77-510).
223. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae, United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. 696 (No. 77-510); Brief Amicus Curiae of Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n & N.M. Wildlife Fed'n,
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No. 77-510).
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and protecting the forest stood as an independent purpose of the
National Forests, capable of generating an implied reservation of water.
Then Parenteau went one step further and said that the "forest" to be
improved and protected included all of its flora and fauna, its plants and
224
its animals, its trees, and its Gila trout. U.S. attorney Don Redd had
suggested the same thing before District Judge Hodges, using the
22
dictionary as his authority, and had gotten nowhere. 5 In the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1978, Parenteau's argument had a post-modem ring,
but he grounded his definition in texts from 1615, 1815, and 1884.226 His
conclusion followed the broad definition as clearly as night followed
day: As used in the 1897 statute, protecting the forests meant protecting
its aquatic wildlife. Protecting fish meant guaranteeing water for them.
Guaranteeing water for them meant legally protecting stream flows.
Therefore, Congress had implicitly reserved water in 1897 for instream
flows necessary for the protection of the fish that were a part of the
"forest." QED.
To all except the New Mexicans. Back in Santa Fe, Simms bridled
at the importation of modem ecological ideas into the 1890-1897 debates
so clearly outlined differently by Klein. His colleagues mocked the
National Wildlife Federation brief, dubbing it the "Evangeline defense"
after Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's epic poem that began with "(t)his
is the forest primeval." 227 Their scom was both a measure of the state of
war into which they had worked themselves and of how worried they
were that contemporary values would insert themselves into a late
nineteenth century debate whose federal/state contours they thought
they (and Klein) so clearly understood.
Then, as far as they were concerned, the Supreme Court itself
laid their worries to rest. In a surprise move, the Court decided that the
Wildlife Federation brief had arrived too late and declined to accept it in
the proceedings. 2 New Mexico lawyers breathed a sigh of relief: at least
they did not have to deal with that. Ironically, the Wildlife Federation

224. Brief Amicus Curiae of Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n & N.M. Wildlife Fed'n at 8-9, United
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No. 77-510).
225. Handwritten notes of Honorable Norman Hodges, supra note 120.
226. Brief Amicus Curiae of Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n & N.M. Wildlife Fed'n, at 9, United
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No. 77-510) (citing John Manwood, TREATISE OF THE
LAWS OF THE FOREST 18-19 (London 1615)); LES TERMES DE LA LEY (J. Johnson, Portland 1812);
William Blackstone, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (Boston, MA 1884).
227. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
228. U.S. Supreme Court, Order List for January 9, 1978, at 5 (showing the Motion of the
Wildlife Federation et al. to file brief was granted at the same time writ of certiorari was

granted); U.S. Supreme Court, Order List for Monday, March 27, 1978, at 2 (showing that
motion of Wildlife Federation was denied for untimely filing).
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brief already had arrived in the Court and copies had been distributed to
the chambers of the various justices. The "Evangeline defense," which
they thought had died, was miraculously resurrected months later as the
basis for the formal dissent in the United States v. New Mexico decision. 229
In the meantime, Richard Simms began the arduous task of
preparing for oral arguments, set by the court for April 18 in
Washington, D.C. By then he had invited Denver lawyer John Carlson to
share the argument with him on the grounds that Carlson spoke for a
client with a concrete interest in limiting the Forest Service claims and
spoke with the kind of eloquence befitting the Supreme Court. Still
Simms had to prepare for his part. He began methodically by outlining
the basic points of New Mexico's position and listing the questions he
might be asked and his answers to them. He tried them out before his
colleagues, who tried to poke holes in what he had to say. Then he went
back to the beginning and followed the same process, again and again
and again. The meticulous preparation was characteristic of Simms in
any case, but he was particularly careful this time since it would be his
first appearance before the nation's highest court, a place most lawyers
never reach in their entire careers. 230
Simms left for Washington a week before the arguments. There,
in a conference room in the Watergate Hotel, he went through the
arguments again, answering the questions of a new panel of volunteer
interrogators. He even went over to the Supreme Court itself and
inspected the awe-inspiring courtroom for the first time. By the
appointed hour, Monday afternoon, April 24, 1978, he felt in perfect
control of the case and the argument that he wanted to make.
In the meantime, the United States had been going through the
same process. Under normal circumstances, the Solicitor General or one
of his assistants would have argued the case before the Supreme Court.
But in an informal practice that had emerged over the years, newly
appointed assistant attorney generals could select one case to argue
before the Court 231 and James Moorman picked United States v. New
Mexico.
"I took that case extremely seriously," he remembers today,
sitting in his unpretentious office at Tax Payers Against Fraud, which he
helped found and where he now works with the same gusto and
southern charm he must have shown as assistant attorney general for
land and natural resources almost 30 years ago. "I took over two weeks
229. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 719 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing same
references used by Parenteau in Amici Curiae brief, supranote 226).
230. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
231. Telephone Interview with Peter R. Steenland, supra note 4.
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preparing for the thing. The Supreme Court justices analyze your
argument and go into it in depth. You have to know your cases when
you're there. As an old hand told me, make sure that you have a list of
your three most important points in mind, because when they start
asking questions, you can be driven right out of your case and the232time
can be up and you realize that you didn't make those three points."
Sure enough, when at 2:22 P.M. on that Monday, Chief Justice
Warren Burger called the case of United States v. New Mexico and invited
Moorman to proceed, Justice Byron White, a westerner from Colorado,
interrupted almost immediately. "What," White asked Moorman, "does
the record show as to why the instream flow issue was even in the case?
233
White wanted to know
Are there any upstream users for the water?"
who could be hurt by the Forest Service claims. Simms and Carlson were
there in person to testify about the potential dangers that extensive
Forest Service claims might pose and Phelps Dodge, Molycorp, and
Carlson's Twin Lake's Reservoir and Canal Company already had
shown in their briefs how the claim might affect their concrete
investments. But it was not their turn and Moorman struggled to answer
White's question by minimizing the impact of the Forest Service claims.
From there, Moorman seemed to struggle to make his three
points. If they surfaced in the remaining portion of his argument, amidst
the slew of questions and queries and jokes that followed from the
bench, it was hard to spot them. "Mr. Moorman," one justice asked,
"where did we get all of these fancy names of the acts [involved here]
like the [1891] Creative Act and the [1897] Organic Act and the [1960]
Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act? Is someone down in the department
234
charged with the responsibility for figuring fancy names?" Moorman
answered, "They are getting worse as I read what is coming out of
Congress, Your honor." At the end of his allotted time, Moorman had
managed to say that protecting the forest and recreation were
independent purposes for which the 1897 Congress had authorized
national forests and that recreation was an additional one. He did not
have time for the third point and had not much illuminated the other
two.
When Richard Simms rose in response for the State of New
Mexico, he felt like he should have been more unsure than he was. "It
was my first time in the Supreme Court," he remembers, "and even
though I'd looked at the courtroom before, you can't imagine how
232. Interview with James Moorman, supranote 160.
233. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978)
(No. 77-510).
234. Id. at 15.
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imposing the place is and how close the podium is to the justices. Still, I
wasn't nervous. I knew what I had to say." 235
He started with the two fundamental points that he had begun
with in the short opening section of the brief that preceded Klein's
exhaustive history. This time he stated them even more succinctly.
"There are two fundamental mistakes in the United States approach to
the reservation of water in the national forests," he boldly began. "The
United States views its powers over western waters as the rule instead of
the exception and the U.S. either ignores or hides from the fact that
Congress explicitly relinquished control of the flow and the use of the
waters in our national forests to the respective states ....
The national
forests were designed with respect to water to maximize water yield to
appropriators under state law." 23 6 In a way that Moorman had never
quite been able to do, in one fell swoop, Simms had made New Mexico's
essential points while countering the United States' central claims.
He went one step further and, in a classic gambit of the oral
advocate, answered the question Justice White had asked of Moorman.
There are upstream users, Simms told the Court, on the Mimbres and
more important elsewhere, who had a direct interest in the extent of
Forest Service claims. Justice White fell for it, asking, almost rhetorically,
"So the in-stream flow is really a live issue?" 237 Simms answered by
going back to Phelps Dodge and the company's $425 milllion investment
in a smelting plant upstream from a part of the Gila National Forest.
White and Simms continued their friendly colloquy, outlining together
New Mexico's case. Then, toward the end of his time, Simms rolled on,
uninterrupted.
"Your honors," he concluded, "I think that what this case boils
down to is an attempt by the United States to protect commendable
environmental values through a scheme of legislation that was designed
to do something else. We have laid out the history of the applicable
legislation. If that history is understood, there is no way in my opinion
that Your Honors could believe the United States and reverse the
decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court. It is simply impossible. If
this case is decided on the basis of historical reality, instead of on the
basis of the regrets of certain Justice Department lawyers now, we are
confident that the decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court will be

235. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
236. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No.
77-510).
237. Id. at 21.
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upheld." 2 The closing was typical Richard Simms: certain, aggressive,
with an underlying moral bite that could offend.
Simms finished at three o'clock on the dot. At that moment,
court closed. The justices disappeared behind a curtain. There was no
way to tell the justices' reactions until the next morning at ten o'clock
when John Carlson would take the remaining 15 minutes of New
Mexico's half-hour of allotted time and Jim Moorman would have his
five minutes of rebuttal.
When John Carlson resumed the next morning, it quickly
became clear that some justices were nervous about the absolutist
position taken by Simms. Carlson began by pointing out the strong
dependence of western states on water generated on high-elevation
national forests. Ninety-five percent of the water in his Colorado, he told
9
the court, arises on Colorado's national forests.n It was not hard to
convince the Court of the importance of the issue. What had troubled
justices overnight was the thought that state appropriators could simply
take all the water on the national forests and leave none there. They
wanted to know whether the purpose of "securing favorable conditions
of water flows," a purpose that New Mexico grudgingly admitted did
not guarantee the Forest some minimum flows since no flows could not
be "favorable." 24° A long series of confusing exchanges ensued where
neither Carlson nor the justices could come to common terms. The
discussion ended in a whimper, not Simms' bang.
Jim Moorman got in the last word in a five-minute rebuttal that
Tuesday morning. Twenty-five years later, thinking back on his opening
argument the day before, Moorman has some misgivings about the
technical three-point approach he had taken at the start. "I should have
taken the high-road," he laments. "I should have emphasized the whole,
not the parts, the ecological integrity of the forests. In retrospect, I could
241
Even so, it was not the route he
have won more justices that way."
took in rebuttal.
Instead, he merely said that the states had "an inordinate fear of
242
the size of the future needs of the national forests." To show how small
those future needs were, Moorman referred to the letter of Chief Forester
Maguire, attached to his last, short brief, saying that the Forest Service
intended to use less than one percent of the water originating on the
238. Id. at 27.
239. Id. at 30.
240. Id. at 33, 40.
241. Interview with James Moorman, supra note 160.
242. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No.
77-510).

Fall 2005]

FOREST SERVICE WATER RIGHTS

forests. To further prove there was nothing for the western states to
worry about, there was Chief Forester Maguire himself sitting in the
front row of spectators in the Supreme Court. Some justices did not like
the tactic. "What happens," asked one, "if the Forest needs jump from
.5% to 20% by 1990?" "Can this Chief," asked another, "bind a future
Chief?" 243 Moorman tried to answer, but if this was the high road, it did
not look as if it led anywhere.
Somehow Moorman later recollected his rebuttal as "electric."
When Chief Justice Berger closed the court that morning, Moorman was
sure that he had won. "I saw Simms and Carlson standing there,
glowering, and I knew that they knew that we had won, too."2 44
"That's ridiculous," says Simms, glowering today. 245
Luckily, it was up to the Supreme Court to decide. On Thursday,
April 28, three days later, the justices met to stake out their basic
positions. Chief Justice Berger opened the conference with what Justice
Blackmun described as a "long review." 246 At that point, Berger was
tending toward affirming the New Mexico Supreme Court on all scores.
The two westerners on the court, Justices White and Rehnquist,
then weighed in. Colorado's White noted that the case involved little
water law and a lot of ancient statutory construction. The briefs, he said,
were good. It was clear to him that the United States had no basis for
1897 reserved rights for grazing or recreation. A reserved right for fish
and wildlife was "[a ] close [question]." Still, at this point, White voted to
247
affirm on all points.
Justice Rehnquist agreed. He noted that it was an important case
to Arizona and the rest of the West. To his mind, the issues involved
"[p]urely statutory construction" and a lot of "legislative history," not
"water law" per se. (Here Rehnquist was falling into Klein's bailiwick.)
In context, Rehnquist argued that the 1897 purposes should be
"[c]onstrue[d] narrowly," thus bringing himself into line with Simms'
basic trajectory. The Court should recognize no reserved rights for
recreation or grazing, as Justice White agreed, but, in addition, Justice
Rehnquist also felt strongly that there should be no reserved rights for
fish or wildlife either.248
That morning four other justices -Stewart, Marshall, Stevens,
and Blackmun-sided with the Chief Justice and the two westerners
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 49.
Interview with James Moorman, supra note 160, at 10.
Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5, at 38.
BLACKMUN, supra note 1.
Id.

Id.
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without adding much, giving seven votes for affirming the New Mexico
Supreme Court. Justices Brennan and Powell alone disagreed. Their
disagreement was primarily directed at reserved water for fish and
wildlife. Speaking first at the conference, Brennan said that
"[s]urely... [the Forest Service] must maintain a flow for fish." Powell
went further. He said that he could not "conceive of a forest sans game &
fish." The United States had to have enough water to maintain the Forest
in its "primeval" condition, thus unwittingly invoking the dreaded
Evangeline defense. 249
At the conference's end that morning, the Chief Justice
designated Justice Rehnquist, a natural choice for many reasons, to draft
the court's opinion in the case. Rehnquist was in the majority. As one of
the two westerners on the court, he was more intimate with western
water matters than the others. Personally he was drawn to western legal
history. United States v. New Mexico had its share of that. In the days
before the appointment of Justice Anton Scalia, who adamantly opposed
the use of legislative history to construe statutes, justices like Rehnquist
felt free to roam around in just the kind of late nineteenth century
2
documents that Don Klein had assembled. 50 Ideologically, he favored
state control over federal control generally and local control over natural
resources in particular. The result the court had just voted on fell
squarely within the parameters of those beliefs. Finally, for all the same
reasons, Justice Rehnquist already had recently drawn the job of writing
the court's decision in another pending western water case in which the
court had also voted to support an expanded state control over (and
diminished federal interest in) federal water projects.
On March 28, 1978, less than a month before oral arguments in
the Mimbres case, the Supreme Court had heard arguments in California
v. United States.251 In that case, the State of California had tried to attach
20 substantive requirements to a huge federal Bureau of Reclamation
project. A California federal district court said that the state could not
control a federal project in that way and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals had agreed. California appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on
the grounds that section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act in fact authorized
just such state control. 25 2 Klein and Simms and the California lawyers
249. Id.
250. Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretationof
Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 647 (1994); see also Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's
Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 369 (1999).
251. BLACKMUN, supra note 1 (Conference Notes on California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645 (1978) (Mar. 28, 1978)).
252. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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knew about the parallel courses of their contemporaneous cases. They
recognized that the two cases squeezed on federal interests in water from
opposite directions, the New Mexico one by cutting down on federal
rights to water, the California one by boosting state control over it. But so
sure was each that the other would lose that the New Mexico and
California lawyers had not talked about their respective briefs.Z3 Now
the two cases merged in the Supreme Court.
At an April third conference, the Supreme Court Justices had
voted in California v. United States and decided to reverse the Ninth
Circuit and uphold the power of western states to control federal
projects. Chief Justice Berger assigned this majority opinion to Justice
Rehnquist too. By April 24, when the Court held oral arguments in
United States v. New Mexico, Rehnquist still had not circulated a draft of a
proposed opinion in the California case.254 On May 3, he was assigned
the majority opinion in United States v. New Mexico as well.
From then until the simultaneous release of both opinions on
July third, the cases were joined as fraternal twins under the care and
tutelage of Justice Rehnquist and his clerks. The two cases shared a
common ideological lineage and a common source in relatively old
federal statutes; in the case of California, section 8 of the 1902
Reclamation Act; in the case of New Mexico, the 1897 Organic Act.
Justice Rehnquist and his clerks must have had a busy two
months of it in May and June, assembling the two opinions
simultaneously. We will never know exactly how they did it because his
clerks have pledged among themselves not to discuss the writing of any
of the Rehnquist opinions as long as the "Chief," as they call him, is still
on the bench.25 5 But there are some tell-tale signs indicating that the two
opinions were done together and that material from one cross-fertilized
the other.
Remember Don Klein in 1977 steaming into State Engineer Steve
Reynolds' office in Santa Fe, 1894 Interior Board of Land Appeal's
decision in the HH Sinclair case in hand, announcing that "Rehnquist
would love this"? Klein was right, but Justice Rehnquist used Klein's
253. Interview with Don Klein, supra note 155, § 2, at 10-11.
254. Memorandum from Keith Ellison, Supreme Court clerk, to J. Harry A. Blackmun,
at 17-18 (Apr. 22, 1978) (on file with the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress).
255. E-mail from Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Professor of Natural Resources Law &
Director of the Stanford Institute for the Environment, Stanford Law School, to G. Emlen
Hall, Professor of Law & Editor-in-Chief of the Natural Resources Journal, The University
of New Mexico School of Law (Feb. 18, 2005, 14:37 MST) (on file with Natural Resources
Journal).
256. Interview with Don Klein, supra note 155, § 2, at 4.
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discovery in California v. United States.257 Remarkably none of the
attorneys in the California case had referred to Klein's 1894 one.
Apparently Justice Rehnquist and his clerks borrowed freely from Don
Klein's research in late nineteenth century state-federal water relations,
applying the New Mexico material to the California case.
In the Mimbres case itself, Justice Rehnquist also borrowed freely
from the various written briefs submitted. From the amicus brief of the
Salt River Project in his own Arizona, he took the reference to the
"gallon-for-gallon" reduction that would occur if the Court recognized
the expansive Forest Service reserved rights for the forests. 25 8 From John
Carlson's oral argument, Rehnquist borrowed the high numbers for state
water originating on National Forests.25 9 From the United States' own
briefs he took the primary/secondary distinction of Forests with which
the United States had tried to escape Reynolds' purpose/use
distinction. 260 From Richard Simms, Rehnquist borrowed the
grammatical parsing of the 1897 Organic Act's tortured language and,
261
more importantly, the basic tilt in favor of state control.
Finally, from Don Klein, Rehnquist, having borrowed from him
literally in California v. United States, took almost everything historical in
the history-heavy United States v. New Mexico. Klein, who counted these
things, found a reference in the final Rehnquist opinion to every piece of
legislative history New Mexico had referred to in its lengthy brief. Only
one document was missing, the revealing 1903 Compilation that Klein
had stumbled on in an obscure corner of the New Mexico Supreme
Court library. "Rehnquist must have missed it," Klein now says, smiling,
2
"because I didn't tell him how to find it."26
Out of this mlange of material, Rehnquist and his clerks melded
a seamless opinion, more severely limiting Forest Service reserved water
257. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 660 n.15.
258. Compare Brief for Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power District as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No.
77-510) ("Application of the Government's claims to the national forests on the Salt and
Verde River watersheds would work a gallon-for-gallon expropriation of downstream
users...."), with United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705 ("When, as in the case of the
Rio Mimbres, a river is fully appropriated, federal reserved water rights will frequently
require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy state
and private appropriators.").
259. Compare Transcript of Oral Argument at 30-31, United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77-510), with United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 699 n.3.
260. Compare Brief of Petitioner at 33, 40, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978) (No. 77-510), with United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702.
261. Compare Brief of Respondent at 7-8, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No.
77-510), with United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707 n.14.
262. Interview with Don Klein, supra note 155.

Fall 20051

FOREST SERVICE WATER RIGHTS

1039

rights than any of the parties to the suit had dared to suggest. Now the
Forest Service could claim reserved water rights for forests like the Gila
only for the essential purposes for which the Forests were established
and, even then, only if without water those essential purposes would be
completely impossible to achieve. Recreation, fish and wildlife, and stock
grazing did not come close to getting over that bar.
As the May 31 first draft of the Rehnquist opinion circulated
among the chambers of the other justices, informal positions solidified.
For example, one of Justice Blackmun's clerks reported to his boss that
263
Rehnquist had done a "solid job" and suggested only minor changes.
However, the opposition also solidified. On June 5, a day after
he received Rehnquist's draft, Justice Powell replied, saying that he and
Justice Brennan would file a partial dissent. The two agreed with
Rehnquist on rejecting recreation and stockgrazing as the basis for
reserved water rights but they disagreed on his rejection of wildlife.
264
"[O]ne of us," Powell told Brennan, "will write."
It turned out to be Powell and his clerks and Brennan's clerk
who hammered out the dissent over the next ten days. Just as Justice
Rehnquist had found help in many places, so too did the Powell crew.
The only amicus brief filed in support of the position of the United States
and now Justices Powell and Brennan had been the brief of the National
and New Mexico Wildlife Federations. When it arrived weeks after the
formal filing deadline, the Court ordered that it not be further
considered. Now many of the sources and even the language of the
Powell dissent came straight out of the banned brief. 265 The point of the
Powell partial dissent was the same too: protecting the forest was an
independent purpose of the 1897 Organic Act and the "forest" included
its flora and fauna.
As the Supreme Court term drew to a close, slightly modified
drafts of the Rehnquist majority opinion and the Powell partial dissent
sped between chambers. On June 15, Justice Brennan formally joined
Powell's dissent. 266 On June 16, the dissent was circulated. On the
nineteenth, Rehnquist added a couple of paragraphs and more footnotes

263. Memorandum from Keith Ellison, Supreme Court clerk, to J. Harry A. Blackmun
(June 4,1978) (on file with the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
264. Memorandum from J. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to J. William H. Rehnquist (June 5, 1978)
(on file with the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
265. Compare Brief Amicus Curiae of Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n & N.M. Wildlife Fed'n at 9,
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (No. 77-510), with United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S.at 721.
266. Memorandum from J. William J. Brennan, Jr., to J. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (June 15,
1978) (on file with the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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to refute some of the points that Powell had made. 267 On the twentythird, a third draft of the majority opinion made the rounds. On the same
day, a wavering Justice White added his name to the partial dissent.
"You have sold me on the birds and bees," he wrote to Powell, thus
making the final vote 9-0 on the recreation and grazing issues and a
closer 5-4 on the wildlife one.268 At that point it looked like United States
v. New Mexico and its companion California case might emerge on time
before the end of the term on the last day of June.
Then the Supreme Court printing office got backed up, as the
Chief Justice warned that it might, 269 and the decisions were not released
until July third. Richard Simms knew that the Court's term ended on
June 30. He arranged to begin his first vacation since he had started
working on the case in November of 1972, after the Court's term ended.
He had gone with his wife and friends on a remote boat trip -without
phones -to Mexico's Sea of Cortes. As soon as he landed in Guaymas on
July 13, he called Reynolds at home in the evening. Reynolds, a diabetic
and a workaholic, was in mild insulin shock when Simms reached him.
"Richard," the usually articulate Reynolds managed to say in a garbled
voice, "you won the whole enchilada" and hung up. 270 It was a clear
victory for state-over-federal control of water. The New Mexicans
celebrated in their own ways. Simms went back to work and
recommended Klein for a merit pay increase for the extraordinary work
that he had done on the history of the case. 271 (Reynolds rejected the
recommendation on the grounds of Klein's irregular work hours. 272)
Klein immediately wrote Judge Hodges in Silver City and told him that
the Supreme Court of the United States had affirmed his ruling.273 The
local Deming paper gave the ruling front page play.
But for the Forest Service it was not a good time. The decision in
United States v. New Mexico limited the agency to the narrowest of claims
under the reserved rights doctrine, those water rights absolutely
essential to the very limited purposes the Court had recognized for the
Forests under the 1897 statute. The decision hung the Forest Service out
267. Memorandum from J. William H. Rehnquist to J. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (June 19,1978)
(on file with the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
268. Memorandum from J. Byron R. White to J. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (June 23, 1978) (on
file with the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
269. Memorandum from C.J. Warren E. Burger to Conference (June 22, 1978) (on file
with the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
270. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5, at 14.
271. Id. at 13.
272. Interview with Don Klein, supra note 155, § 1, at 9.
273. Letter from Don Klein, N.M. Special Assistant Att'y Gen., to Honorable Norman
Hodges, Dist. Ct. J. (July 6,1978) (on file with Natural Resources Journal).
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to dry all across the west at just the time that the Forest Service's new
directions -recreation and fishing- required more and more water. As
the Forest Service looked to the future, history and a court decision
embodying it ran it down from behind. Unable to change the history or
the case, the Forest Service spent the next 25 years trying to work its way
out of it.
V. IN THE WAKE OF THE FOREST WEEPS
The various institutions affected by United States v. New Mexico
began to react to the Supreme Court decision almost immediately. The
academics weighed in, pro and con.274 In New Mexico, the Forest Service
quickly flooded the State Engineer's office with applications for state
appropriative rights for stock watering uses on Forest lands because the
Supreme Court had said that the Forests had no federal reserved rights
for the purpose. The State Engineer's Water Rights Division was almost
overwhelmed by the large number of applications for small quantities of
water. 275 In Washington, the Forest Service slowly realized that the 1978
decision would require the agency to amend its May 1974 Forest Service
Manual, which directed the agency to claim a reserved right for the
instream flows that the Supreme Court had rejected in 1978. In
amendment 27 to chapter 2540 on water uses and development, adopted
in July 1980, the Forest Service grudgingly acknowledged the changes
276
that the Supreme Court had wrought in its future.
However, the real reaction of the federal land holders over the
next 25 years was to try every decade or so to fundamentally shunt
United States v. New Mexico off to the side so that they could be free to
manage the resources on the Forest lands, including the critical water
resources, as best they saw fit.
The first move in that direction came when, on June 23, 1979, the
Department of the Interior invited attendees at the Western States Water
Council, all of which had explicitly joined on the side of New Mexico in
United States v. New Mexico, in Salt Lake City to a filet mignon dinner and
an announcement. 277 After dinner, Secretary of the Interior Andrus
274. Sally K. Fairfax & A. Dan Tarlock, No Water for the Woods: A Critical Analysis of
United States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (1979); see also Alan E. Boles, Jr. &
Charles M. Elliot, United States v. New Mexico and the Course of Federal Reserved Water
Rights, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 209 (1980).
275. Telephone Interview with Bob Rogers, Dist. Ill Supervisor, Office of the State
Eng'r, Deming, N.M., Mar. 2, 2002; Telephone Interview with Paul Saavedra, Director,
Office of the State Eng'r Water Rights Div., Santa Fe, N.M., Apr. 16, 2002.
276.

FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIc., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 2540 (1980).

277.

Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.

1042

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

introduced Interior Solicitor Leo Krulitz. In turn, Krulitz introduced an
incredulous audience of state water administrators and lawyers to a
brand new doctrine: non-reserved water rights, a third category of
federal claims to water on federal lands. There had been federal water
rights acquired under state law and federal reserved water rights under
the doctrine just limited for the Forests in United States v. New Mexico.
Now, to those two, the United States proposed to add a third category,
federal water rights necessary to any federal purpose on federal public
lands.
The audience was stunned. Richard Simms scribbled as Krulitz
talked, writing down what the Solicitor said about the new doctrine and
the recent Supreme Court case. Simms noted that the Solicitor said that,
in various drafts of the opinion announced that evening, "there was no
mention of United States v. New Mexico, that the decision applied only to
the Forest Service, that his opinion overruled the Supreme Court's
278
opinion, and that his opinion "adhered to United States v. New Mexico."
Steve Reynolds listened for a while and then, low on blood sugar, began
to slide again into insulin shock. Simms rushed him again to the hospital,
2 79
this time in Salt Lake City.
Two days later, on June 25, 1979, the Department of the Interior
formally issued the opinion to which Solicitor Krulitz had referred. 280 It
was long. It was scholarly. And it found federal rights to federal water,
unconstrained by either the reservation doctrine or state water law, in
the original federal ownership of land and water, back in time before
there was a forest service, forest lands, states, territories or, indeed,
anything except the United States. Early on the United States had
allowed states and territories to create state rights in water originating on
federal public land. The Supreme Court had then found that Congress
had reserved some more from that state process when it set parts of the
public domain, like the forests, aside for limited federal purposes. But
Solicitor Krulitz' non-reserved water rights went back to a time before all
of that, a time when it owned all the land and the water. If there was any
left, said Krulitz, the United States could now just take it. Federal
officials must have seen these non-reserved rights as primordial.
The western states saw them as predatory, and they screamed.
Over the next three years, opinion after opinion issued from federal land
278. Richard A. Simms, National Water Policy in the Wake of United States v. New
Mexico, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 9 (1980).
279. Interview with Richard A. Simms, supra note 5.
280. Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish & Wildlife Service, Bureau of
Reclamation and the Bureau of Land Management, 86 DECISIONS OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR 553 (1979).
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agency after federal land agency. Each successive one cut farther and
farther back on the boundless residual rights that Krulitz had found. The
opinions were all scholarly. Like all pieces of advocacy, each was
convincing in its own analytical way.281 Naturally, the last, by Theodore
Olsen, now the Solicitor General of the United States, really was the best.
It sharply limited the expansive federal power that Krulitz had found to
the point where it almost disappeared. Now, in Olsen's hands, what was
left of non-reserved water rights fell into the category of not general
executive power where Krulitz had found it but specific congressional
pre-emption, where western senators could control what was left of it.282
This attack on United States v. New Mexico from below was over by 1982.
In early 1986, federal district judge Edwin Mechem, who as a private
attorney had represented one of the original parties in the suit from
which United States v. New Mexico had emerged, drove the only official
judicial nail through the heart of the federal non-reserved water rights
claim, rejecting federal appropriative rights to the extent that they
included rights under the Krulitz theory. 2
Enter Stage II of the Forest Service response to United States v.
New Mexico: securing favorable conditions of water flows.
In the next decade, the Forest Service itself came after reserved
water rights head on when the Service attempted to expand one of the
two categories of reserved rights that the Supreme Court had recognized
in the Mimbres case, "favorable conditions of water flows." After the
Colorado Supreme Court in 1987 cleared the way for the Service to do
so,28 4 the Service put on a case in Colorado's Water Division I beginning
in April 1990 that stretched over a year, involved scores of expert
witnesses from a variety of disciplines, and cost $800,000 for
28 5
demonstrative exhibits - "posters" - alone.
Strangely enough, some of the witnesses in the 1990 proceedings
were related to central characters in the Mimbres debate that had started
20 years before. For example, Roderick Nash, the dean of wilderness
historians who had first written about Aldo Leopold's early days on the
Gila, now himself came to testify on behalf of the Forest Service's claim
for an expansive reading of the recognized reserved right purpose of
281.

See, e.g., Opinion of William H. Coldiron, Nonreserved Water Rights - United States

Law Compliance, 88 DECISIONS OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR 1055 (1981).

282. Federal "Non-reserved" Water Rights, 6 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 328 (1982).
283. Memorandum Opinion and Order, New Mexico v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993
(D.N.M., Jan. 24,1986) (No. 6639-M Civil).
284. United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491 (Colo. 1987).
285. See generally NANCY GORDON, USDA FOREST SERV., GENERAL TECH. REP. RM-GTR270, SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL TESTIMONY IN THE COLORADO WATER DIVISION 1 TRIAL (1995);
Interview with Stuart Shelton, supra note 16; Interview with Stephen Glasser, supra note 7.
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"favorable conditions of water flow." 286 Other real historians replaced
Klein, although they could not agree on the meaning of the 1897 Organic
Act and felt artificially constrained by the 1978 decision. 287 And
Leopold's own son, Dr. Luna Leopold, a pre-eminent ecologist at the
University of California at Berkeley, led a team of fluvial geomorphologists testifying on the needs of high mountain streams for just the kind of
instream flows in the name of "favorable conditions" that the U.S.
Supreme Court had denied in the name of fish and wildlife.
Given the cast of characters, it was hard not to see the 1990
testimony as the kind of case that the Forest Service should have put on
in Deming in the fall of 1972 when it offered two witnesses for two hours
on the subject of all Forest Service reserved water rights. Now, in 1990,
when the Service offered dozens of experts in 28 days of testimony
spreading over a year, it was too late. The Supreme Court in 1978
already had narrowed the scope of federal reserved water rights to the
point where there was very little room to maneuver and the Service had
to drive its real case through the eye of that remaining legal needle.
In the end, it did not work. Division I water judge Robert
Behrman ruled in early 1993 that the Forest Service did not need the kind
of expansive instream flow rights it claimed to maintain "favorable
conditions of water flows." 2 The Forest Service already possessed,
ruled Behrman, all the authority that it needed to control human access
to its streams through its uncontested power to regulate use and
occupancy of forest lands. If, said Behrman, a state-based faucet
threatened to take too much water from a federal stream, the Forest
Service could shut the faucet off. It did not need a water right to do that.
It only needed power over its own land, which it had. 289 Colorado
lawyer John Carlson had suggested precisely the same thing at the end
29
of his 1978 brief in United States v. New Mexico and no one had noticed.
Now water judge Berhman picked up on the idea and based his decision
on it.
The Forest Service, anxious to acquire water rights directly,
wanted to appeal Behrman's ruling, but the Department of Justice, which

286. Transcript of Jan. 10, 1990, In re Application for Water Rights (Colo. Water Ct., Div.
1, 1990) (Case No. W-8439-76) (Testimony of Roderick Nash).
287. Id. (Testimony of Dr. Harold K. Steen, executive director of the Forest History
Society).
288. See GORDON, supra note 285, at 4 (Final Decision, Feb. 12, 1993, in Water Division I).
289. Interview with Stephen Glasser, supra note 7.
290. Brief for Respondents at 34, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No.

77-510).
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controlled such things, refused. 291 Once burned by United States v. New
Mexico, the Department of Justice was reluctant to risk another big loss.
Behrman's ruling stood, but in the defeat of an expansive definition of
federal reserved rights for "favorable conditions of water flows" there
lurked yet another possibility for the expansion of federal control over
forest water: Forest Service control over land.
Recall that the 1897 Organic Act at the heart of United States v.
New Mexico always had authorized federal control of the "use and
occupancy" of lands reserved for National Forests. Early in the litigation,
before they had learned how strong the resistance of state lawyers would
be, Department of Justice lawyers had argued that any control of the
"use and occupancy" of Forest lands would imply the reservation of
necessary water to that use and occupancy. 292 The Supreme Court had
taught them how wrong they were in that approach. But the power to
control use and occupancy remained even if it implied no reserved water
rights. A state-based water right to withdraw water from a forest stream
had to cross federal land to get to that water. State-based rights, driven
by the doctrine of prior appropriation and its emphasis on taking water
from where it naturally occurred and putting it to use where it did not,
had to cross federal lands to do their job. Klein's emphasis on the
nineteenth century right-of-way statutes had proved, if nothing else, that
the ability to cross federal lands was essential to making forest waters
available for state uses. Now, a century later, if the Forest Service wanted
the water left in its streams and could not directly secure the water rights
to do it, then it could indirectly accomplish the same end by limiting
access across its lands to that water.
Enter Stage III of the federal response to United States v. New
the
Colorado bypass flow controversy.
Mexico:
It all got started when non-federal water developers downstream from creeks originating on the National Forest highlands of
Colorado's front range secured permits in the 1920s under existing
federal law allowing them to build dams on forest lands to store winter
flows for summer irrigation and municipal use below the forests.
Projects like this, Don Klein had shown, were exactly what Congress had
in mind when it enacted the late nineteenth century right-of-way
statutes. Cities and farmers from Colorado Springs on the south to Fort
Collins on the north (to say nothing of the sprawling Denver in between)
had long depended on these stored supplies, often storing all winter
291. Interview with Stuart Shelton, supra note 16; Interview with Stephen Glasser, supra
note 7.
292. Transcript of Hearing Before Special Master, app., United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77-510).
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flows behind the dams and leaving none for the forest streams below.
Now, in the late 1980s, the Forest Service, "responding to changing
public values and a more sophisticated knowledge of environmental
health," 293 announced that it would renew the dam permits only if some
flows were restored to the streams below the dams.
The announcement set off battles on a variety of well-publicized
and familiar fronts. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits seemed to uphold
federal authority to "consider" water flows in making land use decisions,
although neither case involved denying access across federal land to
reach water on Forest Service lands. 294 The Forest Service's Steve Glasser,
hoping to head off a collision, had Congress appoint a seven-member
commission, hopefully to straighten out the Colorado mess.295 Despite
early optimism, the commission could not agree and in the end issued
majority and minority reports, each almost as long, as convincing, as
scholarly, and as incompatible296 as had been the almost contradictory
agency opinions on federal non-reserved water rights in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.
New Mexico v. United States haunted the different perspectives.
Proponents of federal power to employ land use controls to achieve
instream flows by limiting state-based access to water on federal land
could point to John Carlson's final point in his 1978 brief to the Supreme
Court. Colorado water judge Robert Behrman had stated the same idea
even more emphatically in 1993 when he denied the Forest Service
instream flow rights to guarantee "favorable conditions of water flow."
The Forest Service," said Behrman on more than one occasion, "controls
the faucet" (through land use controls) so it did not need to worry about
rights to the flow. Now again, advocates for Forest Service power to
require bypass flows in Colorado simply said that United States v. New
Mexico may have limited Forest Service water rights, but bypass flows
involved wholly separate land use controls.
To opponents of Forest Service power to require bypass flows,
this categorization seemed ironic. Hadn't the Forest Service lawyers
claimed in the Mimbres case that all Forest Service "uses" implied a
reservation of water? The Forest Service lawyers had lost that point.

293. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND REsouRcEs LAW 550
(5th ed. 2002).
294. Wyo. Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 792 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1986); Nev. Land
Action Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993).
295. Interview with Stephen Glasser, supra note 7.
296. See Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-127,
§ 389(d)(3), 110 Stat. 888, 1021-22 (1996) (creating a Federal Water Rights Task Force).
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How could they now claim that Forest Service control over uses existed
entirely outside any concern for water?
Besides, the whole debate smacked again of the importation of
modern values into a debate that had been settled a century before and
in favor of the power of private citizens acting under state law to
establish water rights in non-navigable streams. If nothing else, Klein's
history and Rehnquist's opinion had returned the late nineteenth century
debate to the late nineteenth century. At the time that the rights were
established and for a long time thereafter, state water rights required a
diversion from where the water naturally occurred, transportation of the
diverted water to a non-riparian place of use, and application of the
diverted and transported water to beneficial use at the new place of use.
New Mexico even allowed those seeking an appropriation of water a
private right of eminent domain across the lands of unwilling riparian
owners to get access to public water.297 In that context, how could Forest
Service riparian land use controls deny state water holders established
access to appropriative rights?
The Forest Service tried its best to finesse the impasse. In 2000 it
issued a report on Forest Service water policies that restated the
importance of instream flows to its lands but suggested many alternative
methods for securing those flows, some of which paid full respect to the
states. 298 When testifying in 2001 before Congress about the ongoing
Colorado bypass flow controversy, Deputy Forest Service Chief Randy
Phillips allowed as how the Forest Service had no intention of cutting off
299
the more than 8,000 private diversions on Forest Service lands. As if to
prove it, the Service successfully helped to negotiate a series of voluntary
agreements with respect to the controversial Front Range storage dams
and minimum flows below them. For a moment it looked as if the Forest
Service effort to neutralize United States v. New Mexico by employing its
land use controls would not be necessary.
Then, in late 2003, Trout Unlimited hoisted the Forest Service on
its own petard. The Forest Service had negotiated an acceptable
voluntary bypass flow agreement with dam owners on La Poudre Pass
Creek in the mountains west of Fort Collins and Greeley. The Forest
297.

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 467 P.2d 986 (1970).

298. WATER AND THE FOREST SERVICE, supra note 18, at 12; see also FOREST SERV., U.S.
DEP'T AGRIC., WATER FOR THE NATIONAL FORESTS AND GRASSLANDS: INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000) (on file with Natural Resources

Journal).
299. "Bypass Flows" on National Forest Lands: Joint Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Forests and Forest Health and the Subcomm. on Water and Power of the H. Comm. on
Resources, 107th Cong. 19 (2001) (statement of Randy Phillips, Deputy Chief, Programs and
Legislation, USDA Forest Service).
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Service thus hoped to avoid a head-on conflict between its relatively
complete powers over forest land use and its relatively incomplete
power over forest water. "My job," said the Forest Supervisor at the
time, "is to find a balance between the use of N(ational)F(orest)S(ystem)
lands for water facilities and protection of aquatic resources." 3°° An
environmental NGO, Trout Unlimited, disagreed, arguing that the Forest
Service was bound to use its land use powers for the protection of
aquatic species irrespective of the effect on the dam permitees.
In April 2004, U.S. District Judge William Downes sided with
Trout Unlimited in the debate. He found that the Forest Service had
violated the 1976 Federal Land Policy and Management Act
requirements regarding Forest Service issuance of land use permits. The
Forest Service, he held, had the power to require bypass flows and was
obligated to exercise it. He sent the matter back to the Forest Service with
directions to do its duty.301 As late as February 2005, the Forest Service
was still hedging about whether to exercise the clear power that Judge
3° 2
Downes had said the agency had.
VI. CONCLUSION
There the matter rests at this writing, as much in limbo now as it
was when, in 1963, Arizona v. California launched the formal struggle to
define the relative legal rights of the upstream federal Forest Service and
downstream users under state law. United States v. New Mexico tried to
lay the matter to rest in 1978. But, as it turned out, the decision only bit
off a part of the resource issue. It dealt only with the implied federal
reserved rights part of the general water problem and not at all with the
related issue of land control. Faced with changing values and new legal
obligations, the Forest Service and the United States found plenty of
room to maneuver. Today the final contours of state and federal relations
over water originating on the National Forests and flowing down to
private parties below are as clouded as they were when United States v.
New Mexico began.
Two voices, one modern, the other from the past, best capture
the ambiguities. First, retired Forest Service chief Jack Ward Thomas, the
first biologist ever to head the agency, writing in his journal in 1995:
300. Order on Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 24, Trout Unlimited v.
U.S. Dep't Agric., 320 F. Supp 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2004) (Civ. No. 96-WY-2686-WD).
301. Id. at 38.
302. Jesse Fanciulli, Ag Department: Bypass Flows Unnecessary in Most Cases, GREELEY
TRIB., Feb. 2, 2005, available at http://www.greeleytrib.com/article/20050202/NEWS/
102020045/0/ARCHIVES.
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"Things simply don't work the way that students are taught in natural
resources policy classes....There is simply no way that scholars of the
subject can understand the ad hoc processes that go on within only
loosely defined boundaries." 3 3 For all its fine grinding, for all of its
struggle to define and deal with the relative federal and state rights to
western water originating on national forests, for all the good faith
efforts of lawyers and judges to finally set the boundaries of the
relationship that United States v. New Mexico only loosely defined, for
better or worse, the boundaries of a Supreme Court case enclosed a lot of
very different legal territory.
Second, John Wesley Powell writing in Century Magazine in 1890
the
organization of the west, stated:
about
Thus it is that there is a body of interdependent and unified
interests and values, all collected in one hydrographic
basin, and all segregated by well-defined boundary lines
from the rest of the world. The people in such a district
have common interests, common rights, and common
duties, and must necessarily work together for common
This, then, is the proposition I make: that the
purposes ....
entire arid region be organized into natural hydrographic
districts, each one to be a commonwealth within itself for
The plan is
the purpose of controlling and using [water] ....
to establish local self-government by hydrographic
basins.304
Don Klein, the impressed New Mexico historian of late
nineteenth century land law so influential in United States v. New Mexico,
always claimed that Congress got the ball rolling in 1889 when it rejected
this Powell proposal. Instead, beginning in 1890, Congress decided to
divide the world in the manner of William Blake, separating rights to
land from rights to water, setting the federal government on the uplands
side of the equation and the states down below, pitting superior but
limited federal law against servient but general state law. Once so
divided, we have born witness to Thomas's ad hoc processes within very
loose, overlapping, and ill-defined boundaries.

303. JACK WARD THOMAS, THE JOURNALS OF A FOREST SERVICE CHIEF (Harold K. Steen
ed., 2004).
304. John Wesley Powell, Institutionsfor the Arid Lands, 40 CENTURY MAG., MAY 1890, at
111, reprinted in SEEING THINGS WHOLE: THE ESSENTIAL JOHN WESLEY POWELL 308 (William
deBuys ed., 2001).
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In the end, the last word on the Mimbres case should rest where
Aldo Leopold, the original Forest Service steward of the Gila, would
have left it, on the land itself.
On the Mimbres section of the Gila National Forest, where
United States v. New Mexico got started, management life goes on. The
1986 Gila National Forest Land and Resource Plan (LMP) did not even
treat the Mimbres watershed as a planning unit. The two management
areas that contained parts of the watershed hardly mentioned water. The
areas, the 1986 LMP said, would emphasize "a long term increase of
approximately 30 percent in herbaceous forage for wildlife" in a
"livestock/wildlife utilization ratio of 85/15."305
In 1990, the United States and New Mexico agreed that the
United States owned more than 260 claims to water on the Gila National
Forest within the Mimbres River Basin beyond the paltry amount the
Supreme Court had allowed in 1978 as a federal reserved right. The
agreement specified that the Forest Service held the claims under State
law, by and large, as if the United States in this instance was just another
proprietor. 3 6 The federal-state conflict at the heart of United States v. New
Mexico disappeared in this magical solution: the Forest Service won its
water rights and lost its federal supremacy.
All the claims did not add up to much water. As it turned out, all
the recognized claims under state law also were junior to the downstream claims of all state-based users of Mimbres water and subject to
those uses. Simms' worst fears would never come to pass because of the
protections of state law.
Gila planners will start on a new, second plan for the Forest in
October 2007, to replace the 1986 plan, under brand new planning
regulations. As the planners see it now, the issue of water rights on the
section of the Mimbres watershed within the Gila National Forest will
not play a big role in determining how best to manage the watershed
and its resources. Underlying the choices, however, will lurk the Forest
Service's desire now for a recognized right to instream flows and the
Supreme Court's refusal to recognize such a right in 1978.
In the meantime, Richard Simms still says that the Forest Service
is not yet done with its claims to federal control over water originating
on federal lands in the West. Steve Glasser still predicts that the next
great federal-state water battles will come over ground water located on
305.

FOREST SERV., SW. REGION, U.S. DEP'T AGRIc. GILA NATIONAL FOREST PLAN 166

(1986). The 30% and 85/15 ratio were for area 5D. For area 5C, the respective numbers were
10% increase in herbaceous forage and 90/10 livestock/wildlife utilization ratio. Id. at 158.
306. Amended Stipulation on the United States' Water Rights Claims, Mimbres Valley
Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (Civ. No. 6326).
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the National Forests and used below, mostly by swelling mountain
municipalities.
Who knows? The next Supreme Court decision may rise like
United States v. New Mexico did out of a very local New Mexico problem:
a couple of renegade D-9 caterpillar tractors moving water around Luna
County, New Mexico, in the late 1960s. In the early 2000s, the
precipitating event will likely be something quite different. If it is not the
Colorado Front Range dams, it will probably be private wells on Forest
Service lands. For example, the water-strapped resort village of Ruidoso,
high in the Sacramento Mountains of southern New Mexico, depends for
dwindling municipal supplies and a growing municipal demand on a
well field located on Lincoln National Forest lands. Progressive New
Mexico water administrators recognized 50 years ago that pumping
ground water from aquifers connected to surface water diminished interrelated surface flows. Now, as Ruidoso increases pumping from wells
located on Forest Service land and the flow in Eagle Creek running
through Forest land diminishes, as it must, you have the makings of yet
another United States v. New Mexico, pitting once again Forest land use
controls against state water needs.3° 7

307. Telephone Interview with Peter Thomas White, Attorney, Retired Chief Counsel,
N.M. State Eng'r (Jan. 6,2006).

